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CRITICAL HABITAT AND THE CHALLENGE OF REGULATING SMALL HARMS
Dave Owen*
This Article investigates how the United States Fish and Wildlife Service, the National Marine
Fisheries Service, and the courts are implementing the Endangered Species Act’s prohibition on
“adverse modification” of “critical habitat.” That prohibition appears to be one of
environmental law’s most ambitious mandates, but its actual meaning and effect are contested.
Using a database of over 4,000 “biological opinions,” interviews with agency staff, and a review
of judicial decisions considering the adverse modification prohibition, the Article assesses the
extent to which the Fish and Wildlife Service, the National Marine Fisheries Service, and the
courts are relying on the adverse modification prohibition to provide habitat protection. It also
assesses the extent to which they are providing habitat protection by invoking other ESA
provisions. The Article concludes that agency practice and some judicial decisions substantially
depart from statutory requirements, with problematic results, but that the agencies still are
providing substantial habitat protection through other means. It then considers the implications
of these findings, first for ongoing debates about ESA implementation and reform and then for
broader discussions about legal strategies for responding to small environmental harms and the
incremental degradation they cause.
I. INTRODUCTION
On December 7, 2010, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) reluctantly1
designated 187,157 square miles of “critical habitat” for the polar bear,2 a species protected
under the Endangered Species Act (ESA).3

According to the agency, this was a fairly

inconsequential act. FWS predicted minimal regulatory changes,4 only the slightest of economic
impacts,5 and no conservation benefit to the species.6 But those predictions are difficult to
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earlier drafts; participants in the New England Junior Faculty Scholarship Workshop at Suffolk University for
comments on the project concept; many Fish and Wildlife Service and National Marine Fisheries Service staff
members for conducting interviews and responding to my extensive FOIA requests; and Shannon Carroll for
exceptional research assistance.
1
Litigation had forced the agency’s hand. See U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Proposes Polar Bear Critical
Habitat, October 22, 2009, at
http://alaska.fws.gov/fisheries/mmm/polarbear/pdf/PB%20CritHab%20Prop.NR.FINAL.pdf.
2
Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Designation of Critical Habitat for the Polar Bear (Ursus
maritimus) in the United States, 75 Fed. Reg. 76086 , 76086 (Dec. 7, 2010)
3
16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44 (2006).
4
INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS, INC. AND NORTHERN ECONOMICS, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF DESIGNATION OF
CRITICAL HABITAT FOR THE POLAR BEAR IN THE UNITED STATES ES-6 (2010) (“Critical habitat is therefore not
expected to result in additional regulation”).
5
Id. (“economic impacts are forecast to be limited to additional administrative costs”).
1
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reconcile with the text of the ESA. The statute’s protections for critical habitat appear extensive
and stringent; they are, according to one prominent legal scholar, “the highest promontory of the
boldest section of the strongest environmental law in the world.”7 The potential objects of
regulation are almost infinitely numerous, for the habitat of the polar bear is threatened by
greenhouse gas emissions throughout the nation.8 Some environmental advocates therefore
hope, and some industries fear, that the designation has created a legal lever to halt some of the
actions that are incrementally consigning the polar bear to extinction.9
The plight of the polar bear is compelling in its own right—the species has become the
poster animal for climate change activism—and it also exemplifies a classic legal challenge.
Many of environmental law’s greatest remaining problems are caused by the cumulative effects
of many actions, each of which contributes only a small increment to the larger problem.10 If the
causal links between those individual actions and the larger problem are indirect, uncertain, or
obscure, the problems become even harder to address.11 Climate change is a classic example;
although the ultimate environmental challenge is enormous, no single actor is the primary cause,
and millions of actions incrementally contribute. But it is not the only one. The United States’
6

Id. at ES-7 (“the Service does not anticipate that the designation of critical habitat will result in additional
conservation requirements for the polar bear”).
7
William H. Rodgers Jr., Indian Tribes, in THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AT THIRTY: RENEWING THE
CONSERVATION PROMISE 170, 170 (Dale D. Goble et al. eds. 2006).
8
See Determination of Threatened Status for the Polar Bear (Ursus maritimus) Throughout Its Range, 73
Fed. Reg. 28212, 28292-93 (May 15, 2008). The bear also is threatened by emissions from the rest of the world, but
the ESA’s extraterritorial effect is limited.
9
See, e.g., Carl Portman, Resource Dev. Council, Comments of the Resource Development Council Proposed Rule to Designate Critical Habitat for the Polar Bear (FWS-R7-ES-2009-0042) 3 (2010), available at
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FWS-R7-ES-2009-0042-0230.2 (warning of a “vast disconnect
between the Service’s findings and assurances … and the intentions of [the Center for Biological Diversity] and
other environmental groups”). FWS has taken pains to deny the possibility of such regulation. See INDUSTRIAL
ECONOMICS, INC. AND NORTHERN ECONOMICS, supra note 4, at ES-6 (“Critical habitat designation for the polar bear
will not be used by the Service as a vehicle to regulate climate change.”).
10
See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl and James Salzman, Climate Change, Dead Zones, and Massive Problems in the
Administrative State: A Guide for Whittling Away, 98 CAL. L. REV. 59, 64-65 (2010); William Odum,
Environmental Degradation and the Tyranny of Small Decisions, 32 BIOSCIENCE 728, 728 (1982).
11
See Daniel C. Esty, Toward Optimal Environmental Governance, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1495, 1545-46
(1999).
2
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greatest remaining water quality challenges arise from the cumulative effect of many sources of
stormwater runoff.12 Some of the most persistent air pollution problems derive largely from the
collective emissions of millions of engines.13 Indeed, similar challenges pervade regulatory
governance, as the recent economic crisis—a crisis brought on by the cumulative effect of
thousands of ill-advised mortgages and risky investment decisions—made abundantly clear.
Finding legal solutions for these problems is not easy,14 but it is essential.
This Article advances that search by considering regulatory protection of critical habitat.
That protection flows primarily from section 7 of the ESA, which prohibits federal agencies from
taking, permitting, or funding any action “likely to … result in the destruction or adverse
modification” of critical habitat.15 In theory, this “adverse modification” prohibition, as it is
conventionally known, should address the sort of incremental environmental degradation that
threatens many species, including the polar bear.16 Indeed, it appears to be one of the farthestreaching mandates in all of environmental law.17 Practice, however, may be very different. To
explore how the services actually protect critical habitat, I reviewed the results of approximately
three thousand recent “biological opinions” prepared by the FWS or the National Marine
Fisheries Service (NMFS; collectively, I refer to both agencies as “the services”).18 These
biological opinions analyze whether a federal action will impermissibly affect critical habitat or
“jeopardize” the survival of listed species.

19

In practice, biological opinions have, as the

12

See Jonathan Cannon, A Bargain for Clean Water, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 608, 610-11 (2008).
See, e.g., Carol Rose, Environmental Law Grows up (More or Less), and what Science Can Do to Help, 9
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 273, 279-80, 283-84 (2005) (providing examples from water and air pollution control);
Ruhl and Salzman, supra note 10, at 74-75 (describing causes of urban sprawl).
14
See Stephen R. Dovers, Sustainability: Demands on Policy, 16 JOURNAL OF PUBLIC POLICY 303, 312
(1996) (asserting that the difficulty “stems in large part from the inherent inability of the mainstay of most
environmental policy, project oriented assessment, to handle impacts accruing from a number of separate projects”).
15
16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2006).
16
See infra Part II.
17
See Rogers, supra note 7, at 170.
18
For discussion of the process through which the services generate these opinions, see infra Part II.A.2.
19
See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b) (2006).
13
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Supreme Court has put it, a “virtually determinative” effect upon whether and how federal
actions proceed.20 I also reviewed all judicial decisions considering regulatory protections for
critical habitat.21 Finally, I interviewed agency staff to explore their experiences with critical
habitat protection. The result is the first systematic empirical review of the ways critical habitat
actually receives regulatory protection.22
This inquiry begins filling a substantial gap in the otherwise extensive literature on the
ESA. Though critical habitat has been highly controversial23—“an agony of the ESA,” in
Professor Oliver Houck’s words24—the controversy has swirled primarily around critical habitat
designations. Few studies have attempted to explain how the services actually protect critical
habitat once it is designated, or to what effect, and none has provided the breadth or depth of this
inquiry. Perceptions vary widely. Some legal commentators have suggested that the critical
habitat provisions create remarkably powerful protective mechanisms.25 Some economic studies
have found, or simply assumed, dramatic impacts upon regulated entities.26 But the services
have often claimed that the critical habitat provisions are completely redundant, and that other

20

Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 170 (1997).
A larger body of caselaw considers decisions to designate critical habitat, but my focus is on what
happens after a designation is finalized.
22
While broad, the review is not comprehensive. See infra Part III (describing regulatory effects not
addressed by this study).
23
See John Copeland Nagle, The Effectiveness of Biodiversity Law, 24 J. OF LAND USE AND ENVTL. L. 203,
205 (2009) (describing critical habitat as “especially controversial”); Scott Norris, Only 30: A Portrait of the
Endangered Species Act as a Young Law, 54 BIOSCIENCE 288, 291 (2004) (“If the Endangered Species Act … has
become a battleground, the front line is the issue of critical habitat.”).
24
Oliver A. Houck, The Endangered Species Act and Its Implementation by the U.S. Departments of
Interior and Commerce, 64 U. COLO. L. REV 277, 297 (1993).
25
See, e.g., James Salzman, Evolution and Application of Critical Habitat under the Endangered Species
Act, 14 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 311, 311 (1990) (“the ESA’s most controversial and influential enforcement tool”);
Rodgers, supra note 7.
26
Jeffrey E. Zabel and Robert W. Patterson, The Effects of Critical Habitat Designation on Housing
Supply: An Analysis of California Housing Construction Activity, 46 J. OF REGIONAL SCI. 67, 90 (2005) (finding
substantial effects even outside the designated critical habitat area); John M. Quigley and Aaron M. Swoboda, The
urban impacts of the Endangered Species Act: A general equilibrium analysis, 61 J. OF URBAN ECON. 299, 304
(2007) (“For simplicity, we assume that lands designated as critical habitat cannot be used to produce housing at
all.”).
21
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statutory provisions obviate the need for the “adverse modification” prohibition to exist.27 A few
studies have used regression analyses to test whether critical habitat designations lead to
improvements in species status, but the results are conflicting, and the studies do not purport to
explain why critical habitat protection is (or is not) producing results.28 Other researchers have
used case studies to explore ways in which critical habitat can provide protection, but, as with
any case study, the potential for drawing generalized conclusions is limited.29 The process of
implementing the adverse modification prohibition therefore remains a black box with disputed
outputs, and a primary purpose of this inquiry is to expose that black box’s inner workings.30
The results reveal a large discrepancy between statutory requirements and actual practice.
Notwithstanding statutory language that seems to mandate a major role for the adverse
modification prohibition, the services have given it hardly any independent significance, instead
treating the prohibition as a redundant add-on to the ESA’s other protective measures.31 The
services also have consistently treated small-scale habitat degradation as exempt from the
adverse modification prohibition, even though no such exemption appears in the ESA itself.32
That approach has persisted even after a series of court cases called it into question. The services
27

Department of the Interior, Fish and Wildlife Service, Notice of Intent to Clarify the Role of Habitat in
Endangered Species Conservation, 64 Fed. Reg. 31871, 31872 (1999) (“For almost all species, the adverse
modification and jeopardy standards are the same., resulting in critical habitat being an expensive regulatory process
that duplicates the protection already provided by the jeopardy standard.”). For discussion of those other provisions,
see infra Part II.
28
See Martin F. J. Taylor et al., The Effectiveness of the Endangered Species Act: A Quantitative Analysis,
55 BIOSCIENCE 360, 361-63 (2005) (“Critical habitat promotes species survival and recovery.”); Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski, Noah by the Numbers: An Empirical Evaluation of the Endangered Species Act, 82 CORNELL L. REV.
356, 384 (1997) (“Designation of critical habitat appeared to benefit species, but the evidence for this proposition
was weak.”); but see Joe Kerkvliet and Christian Langpap, Learning from endangered and threatened species
recovery programs: A case study using the U.S. Endangered Species Act recovery scores, 63 ECOLOGICAL ECON.
499, 506-07 (2007) (finding no causal relationship).
29
See Kieran F. Suckling and Martin Taylor, Critical Habitat and Recovery, in THE ENDANGERED SPECIES
ACT AT 30: RENEWING THE CONSERVATION PROMISE 80-85 (Dale D. Goble et al. eds 2006).
30
This problem is not limited to the ESA’s critical habitat provisions. See Barton H. Thompson, The
Endangered Species Act: A Case Study in Takings and Incentives, 40 STAN. L. REV. 305, 307 (1997) (“One problem
with undertaking a case study of the ESA is that there is a scarcity of verifiable data and information.”).
31
See infra Part IV.
32
See id.
5

also have struggled to articulate a standard for determining what constitutes adverse
modification, and, in many individual biological opinions, have offered rationales that seem to
ignore both statutory text and the incremental nature of the habitat degradation most species
face.33 While critical habitat has assumed slightly more significance in the courts, the judiciary
also has not decided how protective the critical habitat provisions should be.34 The provisions
have had some impact, notwithstanding the services’ periodic assertions that critical habitat
designations are purely a waste of money and time. But the effects on regulatory processes,
though real, have been minor and subtle.
These disparities between statutory text and actual practice are only half of the story,
however. Even if the adverse modification prohibition is doing little to protect critical habitat,
the services are invoking other provisions of the ESA as substitutes.35
extensive and, in some ways, pragmatic and creative.36

Those efforts are

There are problems with these

alternative approaches—most importantly, they seem designed to slow rather than stop habitat
degradation—but they nevertheless provide substantial habitat protection, albeit not in the ways
the statute itself might lead one to expect.37
These paradoxical results undermine some of the classic narratives of ESA
implementation and, more generally, are inconsistent with some prevalent understandings of
administrative agency behavior.

One of the dominant narratives, raised often though not

exclusively by opponents of the act, suggests the ESA creates an inflexible “command-andcontrol” regulatory scheme.38 That view reflects a broader criticism alleging that environmental
law is generally characterized by rigid, top-down schemes myopically implemented by tunnel33

See infra Part IV.A.
See infra Part IV.C.
35
See infra Part IV.B.
36
See id.
37
See id.
38
See infra Part V.A.
34

6

visioned agencies.39 A rather different critique, often asserted by frustrated supporters of the
act’s basic goals, asserts that the ESA is a “paper tiger,”40 which reluctant agencies implement
only to the extent compelled by the citizen suits of non-governmental litigants.41 Though these
critiques may seem nearly opposite, both share an underlying cynicism about governmental
implementation of the ESA—a cynicism that also typifies much of the rhetoric of regulatory
governance.42

In both narratives, the services are somewhat passive entities, either

implementing an unreasonable statute with mindless rigidity or persistently bowing to the
focused pressure of moneyed interest groups,43 and ESA implementation is fundamentally
flawed. Not surprisingly, both narratives also support calls for dramatic reforms.
But neither narrative explains what the services are actually doing. The assertions of
inflexibility are belied by the services’ selective non-use of a seemingly mandatory statutory
provision.

They also cannot explain the services’ substitute approaches, for despite the

conventional characterizations of ESA-based regulation as a centralized, rigid, command-andcontrol scheme, those alternative approaches have evolved largely through decentralized,
negotiation-driven processes.44 The paper tiger narrative comes closer to the mark, for the
39

See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Quality as a National Good in a Federal State, 1997 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 199, 203, 213 (describing a “burdensome” system with “many grievous flaws”).
40
See J.B. Ruhl, Is the Endangered Species Act Eco-Pragmatic?, 87 MINN. L. REV. 885, 886 (2003)
(explaining (and rejecting) this view of the ESA).
41
See, e.g., Houck, supra note 24, at 311 (“the ESA’s prohibitions against jeopardy and habitat designation
are enforced solely through citizen actions in the courts”).
42
Even President Obama, though generally sympathetic to regulatory initiatives, has prominently belittled
this scheme. See Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at the State of the Union Address, January 25, 2011, at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/25/remarks-president-state-union-address (suggesting that a
bifurcated system of authority over salmon exemplifies a flawed “government of the past”).
43
This view parallels conceptions of administrative agency action prevalent both in some law-andeconomics critiques of regulatory governance, in public choice theory, and, though from a different ideological
perspective, in environmentalists’ arguments in favor of citizen intervention in administrative decisionmaking. See,
e.g., Nathaniel O. Keohane et al., The Choice of Instruments in Regulatory Policy, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 313,
320-21 (1998) (summarizing law and economics studies asserting that regulatory policy passively reflects external
interests); DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 17–21
(1991) (describing public choice theory, which asserts a similar view and informs many of the law and economics
studies); JOSEPH L. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT 63-64 (1970).
44
See infra Part V.A.
7

services’ chosen regulatory approaches depart from statutory text in ways that appear to
compromise species protection. But the services still are providing a lot of habitat protection,
often in the face of intense resistance, and even where external pressure from environmental
groups can provide at most a partial explanation for their actions.45 The incompleteness of both
of these narratives has implications for ESA reform efforts and for environmental law reform
more generally. Most importantly, while reforms are needed, they need not be drastic. Existing
law and existing institutions contain positive features worth building upon.
The Article therefore closes by recommending several modest reforms, and in so doing
returns to one of the core dilemmas of regulating incremental environmental degradation. Any
such regulatory effort must resolve when, if ever, harms are too small to address, and how to
compensate for the harms that escape regulatory coverage.46 The services have never figured out
a coherent answer to those questions. Workable answers do exist; a combination of regulatory
approaches developed in several other areas of environmental law could improve the critical
habitat program.47 None of these approaches is a panacea, each has its critics and its flaws, and
my recommendations in combination may seem to prescribe a sort of regulatory kitchen-sink
soup.

But the jumble is partly the point.

The sometimes-bewildering complexity of

environmental law can make simplification seem like an essential goal, and one might readily
presume that some single regulatory instrument—perhaps an existing tool, perhaps something
new—should predominate.48 The critical habitat experience illustrates, however, that regulators

45

See infra Part V.B.
This question was famously addressed by the Supreme Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, which
noted that agencies should “whittle away” at massive problems. 549 U.S. 497, 524 (2007). But that observation
begs the question, answered by neither the majority nor the dissent, how one determines when the cut is too small to
be worth the whittler’s effort.
47
See infra Part VI.
48
See, e.g., Mary Christina Wood, Advancing the Sovereign Trust of Government to Safeguard the
Environment for Present and Future Generations (Part I): Ecological Realism and the Need for a Paradigm Shift,
46
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often need a variety of tools, and, subject to some statutory guidance, can and will use that
variety in creative and effective ways. Environmental law’s cacophony of regulatory approaches
and options therefore holds value, and the best approach for addressing major environmental
challenges will be not some dazzling new innovation but rather a complex, label-defying
combination of existing approaches.
This Article’s analysis proceeds as follows. Part II explains how the ESA protects
critical habitat and how those provisions fit within the larger statutory scheme. Part III explains
the methodology I used to assess how the services implement those provisions in practice. Part
IV sets forth the results, exploring both the discrepancy between statutory mandates and actual
practice and the alternative ways the services are providing habitat protection. Part V considers
the implications of those results for traditional views of the ESA, and concludes that the results
undermine two of the predominant narratives of ESA implementation. Part VI explains how the
services’ regulatory approaches could be improved. It also reflects more broadly on this study’s
lessons for regulatory efforts to address the challenges of incremental environmental
degradation.

II. THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS
The ESA is the United States’ most important law for the protection of biodiversity. The
act is designed to prevent the extinction of imperiled animal and plant species and to promote
those species’ recovery.49 To those ends, it requires the services to “list” species that are in

39 ENVTL. L. 43, 57 (2009) (citing “a regulatory complexity that is mind-boggling” as a primary reason for
environmental law’s alleged failure).
49
See 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (defining “conservation” of species as the core statutory goal); id. § 1532(3)
(defining conservation in terms of recovery).
9

danger of extinction50 and to designate critical habitat for those species.51 It then provides listed
species and their habitat with a series of regulatory protections.
The ESA’s focus on habitat is no coincidence. For decades, scientists have been warning
that habitat loss is the single most important threat to biodiversity,52 and Congress was well
aware of this threat when it enacted the statute. 53 The challenge has only grown in recent years,
with climate change now adding to a host of pre-existing stressors.54 Some predictions of the
combined impacts of these stressors are staggering. A 2004 study published in Science, for
example, predicted that with the added stress caused by climate change, 15% to 37% of all global
species could be committed to extinction by 2050.55
This section explains the ESA’s habitat-protection provisions, beginning with critical
habitat, then discussing other key provisions that are partially, though not exclusively, focused
on habitat protection, and then explaining how—on paper, at least—the different provisions
would seem to interact.
A. The Critical Habitat Requirements
1. Definitions and designation procedures
Critical habitat is a crucial portion of the historic habitat of a threatened or endangered
species. ESA section 3 defines the term “critical habitat” as including both occupied and
unoccupied habitat with “physical or biological features… essential to the conservation of the
50

See id. § 1533.
Id. § 1533(a)(3).
52
See, e.g., David .S. Wilcove et al., Quantifying threats to imperiled species in the United States, 48
BIOSCIENCE 607, 609 (1998).
53
See Amy Sinden, The Economics of Endangered Species: Why Less is More in the Economic Analysis of
Critical Habitat Designations, 28 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 129, 143 & n.65 (2004).
54
See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: WORKING GROUP II:
IMPACTS, ADAPTION AND VULNERABILITY, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 11 (2007); J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change
and the Endangered Species Act: Building Bridges to the No-Analog Future, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1 (2008).
55
Chris D. Thomas et al., Extinction Risk from Climate Change, 427 NATURE 145, 145 (2004); see IPCC,
supra note 54, at 11 (“Approximately 20-30% of plant and animal species assessed so far are likely to be at
increased risk of extinction if increases in global average temperature exceed 1.5-2.5°C.”).
51
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species.”56 The statute sets some limits on the breadth of the designation, and critical habitat
cannot include the entire historic range of the species.57 The services also may invoke economic
costs to exclude some areas from the designation.58 But if habitat is necessary for the species’
survival or recovery, it should be included.
In almost all circumstances, that habitat should be designated whenever the services
determine that a species is threatened or endangered. Under ESA section 4, the services, “to the
maximum extent prudent and determinable, shall… designate” critical habitat, and “may, from
time-to-time thereafter as appropriate, revise such designation.”59
observed that mandate largely in the breach.60

For years, the services

But judicial decisions have consistently

compelled designations, and the services are slowly catching up.61 Over 600 species now have
designated critical habitat, and the percentage of species with designated habitat is gradually
rising.62
In practice, the designations generally describe particular geographic areas, though they
may also describe certain landscape features that lead to inclusion in or exclusion from the

56

16 U.S.C. § 1532(5) (2006). The ESA defines “conservation” in terms of recovery, and critical habitat
therefore is habitat with features that make it essential to species’ survival or recovery.
57
Id. § 1532(5)(C).
58
Id. § 1533(b)(2).
59
Id. § 1533(a)(3). In an approach that departs from much of the rest of the ESA, the services must
consider economic impact when designating critical habitat. Id. § 1533(b)(2).
60
See Sinden, supra note 53, at 157-59.
61
See Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 378 F.3d 1059, 1069-71 (9th Cir.
2004); N.M. Cattle Growers Ass’n v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., 248 F.3d 1277, 1283 & n. 2 (10th Cir.2001);
Sierra Club v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., 245 F.3d 434, 441-42 (5th Cir. 2001).
62
For a list of species with designated critical habitat, see U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Listed Species
with Critical Habitat, at http://ecos.fws.gov/tess_public/CriticalHabitat.do?nmfs=1 (last checked December 15,
2010). A full list of protected species is available at http://www.fws.gov/endangered/species/us-species.html (last
checked December 15, 2010). As of February 26, 2011, 603 of the 1,371 listed U.S. species have designated critical
habitat.
11

designated area.63 Millions of acres of habitat have now been designated, and in some parts of
the country, swaths of critical habitat cover much of the map.64
2. Procedural and substantive protections
The actual protection of those millions of acres of critical habitat derives from ESA
section 7.65 Substantively, section 7 limits the ability of federal agencies to undertake, fund, or
permit actions that degrade critical habitat. It directs those agencies to “insure that any action
authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency… is not likely to… result in the destruction or
adverse modification of habitat of such species which is determined by the Secretary, after
consultation as appropriate with affected States, to be critical.”66 In practice, this provision is
often simply referred to as the “adverse modification prohibition.”
Procedurally, section 7 requires federal agencies taking actions (“action agencies,” in
ESA-speak) that might adversely affect listed species to “consult” with the relevant service67 and
obtain a written report known as a “biological opinion.” The biological opinion expresses the
service’s opinion about whether the project will “jeopardize” the survival of listed species (a
concept explained in more detail below) or will result in adverse modification.68 If the service
concludes that adverse modification is likely to result from the project, its biological opinion
should identify “reasonable and prudent alternatives” that could be implemented without causing
adverse modification or jeopardy.69 Once the action agency has received a biological opinion, it
63

See, e.g., Designation of Critical Habitat for the Polar Bear (Ursus maritimus) in the United States, 75
Fed. Reg. 76086 , 76119 (Dec. 7, 2010) (excluding “manmade structures on all types of land ownership”).
64
See U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Critical Habitat Portal, at http://crithab.fws.gov/. The link accesses
an on-line mapping tool. Total figures are hard to find, but the critical habitat for polar bears alone encompasses
187,157 square miles. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, Polar Bear Critical Habitat: Some Frequently Asked Questions
(2010) at http://alaska.fws.gov/fisheries/mmm/polarbear/pdf/critical_habitat_factsheet_11_2010.pdf.
65
16 U.S.C. § 1536 (2006).
66
Id. § 1536(a)(2).
67
With some exceptions, NMFS holds jurisdiction over marine and anadromous fish species and FWS
holds jurisdiction over terrestrial and freshwater species.
68
16 U.S.C. § 1536 (2006).
69
Id. § 1536(b)(4).
12

theoretically holds discretion to follow or disregard the opinion’s recommendations.70 But in
practice, action agencies hardly ever proceed with an action that the services predict will cause
adverse modification or jeopardy.71
This “formal consultation” process is usually preceded by and often intertwined with a
more informal process in which the action agency and the services negotiate changes to the
project.72 Those discussions can result in a variety of outcomes. First, the services often concur
that a project will not adversely affect listed species or their critical habitat, in which case the
project may simply proceed.73 Conversely, the action agency might decide that the impact on
species will be too large and unavoidable and might walk away from the project. It might also
significantly modify the project, and those changes can result in a new project description or in
the inclusion in the biological opinion of “conservation measures,” which are binding conditions
that the action agency must implement for the opinion to remain valid.74

The services might

also determine that a project will not lead to jeopardy or adverse modification but nevertheless
may find that it will “take” listed species.75 The services then will usually impose conditions—
known in ESA parlance as “reasonable and prudent measures”—designed to reduce the level of
take.76

Finally, the biological opinion may also include “conservation recommendations,”

which are non-binding measures that would minimize harm to species or promote their
recovery.77 The jumble of terms and acronyms is bewildering, but in summary, there are many
ways that consultation can change a project and minimize its negative impacts on habitat.
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50 C.F.R. § 402.15(a).
See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 170 (1997).
72
U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE AND NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE, ENDANGERED SPECIES
CONSULTATION HANDBOOK 3-1 (1998).
73
Id. at 3-1.
74
See id. at xii.
75
Id. at 4-45 to 4-52. For discussion of the ESA’s “take” prohibition, see infra part II.C.
76
See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4) (2006); CONSULTATION HANDBOOK, supra note 72, at 4-52 to 4-54.
77
See CONSULTATION HANDBOOK, supra note 72, at xii.
71
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Every year, thousands of actions are subject to this consultation process. Section 7
applies only to federal agencies, and therefore purely state, local, or private actions do not
require consultation.78 But many of the governmental and private actions that affect species
habitat involve federal funding or permits,79 and the federal government itself also carries out
hundreds of species-affecting projects every year.80
B. The Jeopardy Prohibition
In addition to its adverse modification prohibition, section 7 also precludes federal
agencies from taking actions “likely to jeopardize the continued existence” of any listed
species.81 This prohibition is implemented through the same consultation process, and biological
opinions always state whether or not the project is likely to cause jeopardy.82 The jeopardy
analysis should encompass any threat a project poses to listed species, including but not limited
to habitat degradation, and in practice most jeopardy analyses include extensive discussion of the
action’s potential habitat effects.83
The jeopardy prohibition has received much more attention than the prohibition on
adverse modification. Some academic analyses of ESA section 7 focus entirely on jeopardy;84
practicing attorneys often just refer to section 7 as “the jeopardy prohibition,” as though the
adverse modification prohibition did not exist; and, as discussed in more detail below, the
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16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2006) (imposing obligations on “[e]ach federal agency”).
For example, many development projects require dredge and fill permits issued by the U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers, and many transportation projects depend on federal funding.
80
See infra Part IV (discussing the large number of consultations for fish species alone).
81
16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
82
CONSULTATION HANDBOOK, supra note 72, at 4-33 to 4-34.
83
With the exception of biological opinions for ocean fishing activities, the jeopardy analysis in every
biological opinion I reviewed included discussion, usually extensive, of habitat impacts.
84
See, e.g., Ruhl, supra note 54, at 42-49 (focusing on jeopardy while analyzing section 7’s role in
responding to climate change).
79
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services have often asserted that the jeopardy prohibition obviates the need for regulatory
protection of critical habitat.85
C. The Take Prohibition
The ESA’s other major substantive prohibition comes from section 9, which makes it
unlawful for “any person” to “take” any endangered species.86 The act defines “take” broadly.
In addition to actions like hunting animals, the definition includes actions that “harm” listed
species,87 and the Supreme Court has upheld agency regulations that treat some forms of habitat
modification as prohibited “takes.”88 Consequently, as with the jeopardy prohibition, a key part
of the take prohibition’s role is to protect habitat.
Though far-reaching, the take prohibition is not absolute. Private parties may obtain
“incidental take permits” if they prepare “habitat conservation plans” that meet the requirements
of ESA section 10.89 Those habitat conservation plans generally include measures to minimize
and compensate for the expected take.90 Federal agencies (and recipients of permits or funding
from federal agencies) also may obtain “incidental take authorization” if they complete the
section 7 consultation process and implement the “reasonable and prudent measures” specified in
a biological opinion.91 But even with those potential exceptions, the take prohibition is generally
viewed as a key part of the substantive core of the ESA.92
D. The Combination of Approaches
85

See infra notes 108-112 and accompanying text. See also Barton H. Thompson, People or Prairie
Chickens: The Uncertain Search for Optimal Biodiversity, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1127, 1141 (“critical habitat plays only
a secondary role”).
86
16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1) (2006). By regulation, the services have extended these protections to many
threatened species.
87
Id. § 1532(19).
88
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
89
16 U.S.C. § 1539(a); see J.B. Ruhl, How to Kill Endangered Species, Legally: The Nuts and Bolts of
Endangered Species Act “HCP” Permits for Real Estate Development, 5 ENVTL. LAW. 345 (1999).
90
See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(A)(ii) (2006).
91
Id. § 1536(b)(4).
92
See ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW, AND SOCIETY
428 (4th ed. 2010).
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Within this suite of protections, the adverse modification prohibition occupies an
interesting—and hotly debated—niche. Without question, its protections are partly redundant,
for some habitat modification will be precluded by the jeopardy prohibition, the take prohibition,
or both. For many years, the official position of the services was that the adverse modification
protections were completely redundant, a position with which some commentators concurred.93
But the plain language of the statute indicates, and some other commentators and courts have
agreed, that the critical habitat provisions are not entirely redundant, and that for many federal
agency actions they should hold independent significance.94
The potential for overlap is obvious. If a federal agency action is likely to cause major
negative impacts to listed species, the jeopardy prohibition should apply, and the critical habitat
provisions will just offer an overlapping layer of protection.

The controversy at issue in

Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, the Supreme Court’s first seminal ESA case, provides a good
example. 95 There, the TVA proposed to operate a dam expected to obliterate all known habitat,
including all designated critical habitat, of the snail darter, a listed species.96 Such an action was
clearly likely to cause both adverse modification and jeopardy. Similarly, if an action will lead
to clear and discernible impacts to identifiable animals, the take prohibition should apply,97 and
the critical habitat protections again just offer a redundant layer of protection. TVA v. Hill
provides an example here as well; the killing of all known members of a species would clearly
constitute a prohibited set of takes. Nevertheless, there would appear, at least on paper, to be
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See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 100-105 and accompanying text.
95
437 U.S. 153 (1978).
96
The dam eventually was built, and “[t]o everyone’s surprise, the snail darter did not go extinct.” Holly
Doremus, The Story of TVA v. Hill: A Narrow Escape for a Broad New Law, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW STORIES
109, 134 (Richard J. Lazarus and Oliver O. Houck eds. 2005).
97
See supra notes 86-Error! Bookmark not defined. and accompanying text.
94
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circumstances in which the adverse modification prohibition would apply but the jeopardy and
take prohibitions would not.98
1. Adverse modification and jeopardy
The adverse modification prohibition appears to go beyond the jeopardy prohibition in
two categories of actions.99
First, some federal actions may adversely modify habitat but not cause enough harm to
create a likelihood of jeopardy. The services have consistently asserted that even after a species
has been listed, it is generally possible to cause additional harm to the species without pushing it
over the brink into jeopardy.100 At least in some circumstances, this is a plausible statutory
interpretation.101 The adverse modification prohibition, by contrast, is more absolute. The
statute does not define the phrase, but its meaning should be clear. “Adverse,” in common
parlance, means against or for the worse,102 and modification, according to Black’s Law
Dictionary, means “a change to something.”103

No size modifiers accompany the phrase

“adverse modification;” the ESA does not use “major,” “significant,” or any other analogous
phrase, notwithstanding those words’ prominent appearances in other contemporaneously-

98

But see infra Part IV (discussing the services’ apparent determination that these circumstances do not
actually exist).
99
For a parallel analysis of the relationship between jeopardy and adverse modification, see Houck, supra
note 24, at 300-01.
100
See CONSULTATION HANDBOOK, supra note 72, at 4-36 (explaining that not all adverse effects will rise
to the level of causing jeopardy); Daniel J. Rohlf, Jeopardy under the Endangered Species Act: Playing a Game
Protected Species Can’t Win, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 114, 141-42 (2001) (describing the services’ willingness to
allocate the “buffer” of tolerable harm ).
101
If a species’ population is stable or improving, it could absorb some harm from individual actions
without its continued existence being jeopardized.
102
See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th Ed. 2004) (defining adverse: “1. Against; opposed (to). 2. Having
an opposing or contrary interest, concern, or position. 3. Contrary (to) or in opposition (to). 4. Hostile”).
103
Id. (“1. A change to something; an alteration … 2. A qualification or limitation of something…”).
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drafted environmental laws.104 The plain language therefore precludes federal agency actions
from causing negative changes to critical habitat, even if the change is small.105
Second, some federal actions will adversely modify habitat but will have uncertain
impacts upon species’ survival. Uncertainty pervades implementation of the ESA.106 The
services do not always know the extent to which a proposed action will affect a species’
viability.

Often they are also uncertain about species’ status and population trend.

107

Consequently, determining whether an individual project might pose enough risk to create
jeopardy can be quite difficult. Yet the services may still know that the action will adversely
affect the species’ habitat. Determining whether a single clearcut in spotted owl critical habitat
will tip spotted owls into a state of jeopardy may be very difficult, for example, but discerning
whether the clearcut will have adverse impacts on critical habitat ought to be much easier.
To say that these interpretations are compelled by statutory language is not to say that
they have been adopted by the services. In joint regulations promulgated in the 1980s, the
services defined “adverse modification” not as any adverse change to designated critical habitat,
but instead as “a direct or indirect alteration that appreciably diminishes the value of critical
habitat for both the survival and recovery of a listed species.”108 That definition, as numerous
commentators and judicial opinions have pointed out, narrows the definition of adverse
modification and gives the green light to actions that might limit recovery without appreciably
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See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2006) (requiring environmental impact statements for “major” federal
actions “significantly” impacting the environment).
105
See Rodgers, supra note 7, at 170 (“Backing the tractor over a single salmon redd is an actionable deed
of “destruction” or “modification” if the necessary paperwork is done.”).
106
See COMMITTEE ON SCIENTIFIC ISSUES IN THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT, BD. ON ENVTL. STUDIES &
TOXICOLOGY, COMM’N ON LIFE SCIENCES, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND THE ENDANGERED SPECIES
ACT 143-54 (1995); Holly Doremus, The Purposes, Effects, and Future of the Endangered Species Act’s “Best
Available Science” Mandate, 34 ENVTL. L. 397, 438 (2004) (“Uncertainty is endemic in the ESA context.”).
107
See Teresa Woods and Steve Morey, Uncertainty and the Endangered Species Act, 83 IND. L.J. 529,
531-33 (2007).
108
50 C.F.R. § 402.02.
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reducing the species’ odds of survival.109 In their joint consultation handbook, the services
stretched that regulatory definition a step further. “Modification or destruction of designated
critical habitat that does not reach” the “appreciable” threshold, they claimed, should not count
as adverse modification, and “is not prohibited by section 7.”110 The agencies also defined the
phrase “appreciably diminish” to mean “considerably reduce.”111 All of these words contain a
somewhat deliberate vagueness, but the services apparently intended to create an exception for
small-scale modification or destruction of habitat—an exception that appears nowhere in the text
of the statute itself. On the basis of these definitions, the agencies then asserted, and some
commentators agreed, that the critical habitat protections were redundant.112
But these definitions no longer hold any legal force. Environmental groups repeatedly
challenged the regulatory definition of adverse modification, arguing that it was inconsistent
with the statute, and they repeatedly won.113 In December 2004, in response to these decisions,
FWS directed its staff to ignore the regulations and rely on statutory text alone.114 NMFS soon
issued a similar memorandum.115 The regulations have not been withdrawn or replaced, but the
biological opinions of both services now routinely disclaim any reliance on the regulatory
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See, e.g., Sinden, supra note 53, at 153-57; Houck, supra note 24, at 297, 300-01.
Id at 4-35.
111
Id. at 4-36 to 4-37.
112
See supra note 27.
113
Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., 378 F.3d 1059, 1069-71 (9th Cir. 2004);
N.M. Cattle Growers Ass’n v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., 248 F.3d 1277, 1283 & n. 2 (10th Cir.2001); Sierra
Club v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., 245 F.3d 434, 441-42 (5th Cir. 2001).
114
Memorandum from Marshall Jones, Acting Director, to Regional Directors, Regions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and
7 Manager, California-Nevada Operations Office, Dec. 9, 2004, available at
http://www.fws.gov/midwest/endangered/permits/hcp/pdf/AdverseModGuidance.pdf.
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William T. Hogarth, Ph.D., Memorandum to Regional Administrators, Office of Protected Resources,
Re: Application of the “Destruction or Adverse Modification” Standard under Section 7(a)(2) of the Endangered
Species Act, Nov. 7, 2005.
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definitions.116 The services therefore are back, at least in theory, to the statutory text, and that
text gives the jeopardy and adverse modification prohibitions independent roles.
2. Take and adverse modification
The take prohibition also overlaps significantly, but not completely, with the ESA’s
prohibition on adverse modification. Many actions that modify habitat also directly take listed
species. A timber sale or a dam project, for example, will have significant adverse impacts on
habitat and is also likely to directly kill or harm members of species inhabiting the area. But, as
the Supreme Court’s Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon v. Babbitt
decision points out, not every habitat modification will result in take.117 In his opinion for the
Court, Justice Stevens stressed that the take prohibition applies only to actions that “actually kill
or injure wildlife.” 118 Justice O’Connor elaborated on this point, saying that her concurrence was
“predicated on [her] understanding that the challenged regulation is limited to significant habitat
modification that causes actual, as opposed to hypothetical or speculative, death or injury to
identifiable protected animals.”119 She later cited an example that clearly demonstrates her
understanding of the outer boundaries of the take prohibition. In dissent, Justice Scalia had
raised the specter of section 9 applying to “a farmer who tills his field and causes erosion that
makes silt run into a nearby river which depletes oxygen and thereby injures protected fish.”120
Under any reasonable definition of the term, that farmer would be adversely modifying critical
habitat if the river were so designated; his actions would cause a change, and that change would
116

See, e.g. U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, NEW MEXICO ECOLOGICAL SERVICES FIELD OFFICE,
BIOLOGICAL OPINION: BUCKMAN WATER DIVERSION PROJECT 1 (2007) (hereinafter BUCKMAN DIVERSION
BIOLOGICAL OPINION) (“This biological opinion does not rely on the regulatory definition of ‘destruction or adverse
modification’ of critical habitat at 50 CFR 402.02. Instead, we have relied upon the statute and the [Gifford Pinchot
Task Force decision]… .”).
117
515 U.S. 687 (1995).
118
Id. at 690, 700 n.13 (quoting the services’ joint regulations).
119
Id. at 708-09. Justice O’Connor was not the deciding vote in the case, so her concurrence has no
precedential authority. But it does suggest how other courts might interpret the boundaries of the take prohibition.
120
Id. at 719.
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be for the worse. 121 But according to Justice O’Connor, the farmer would not be causing a take,
presumably because the causal chain between his action and harm to identifiable individual fish
would be too attenuated or too difficult to discern.122
Sweet Home suggests two categories of actions that would trigger the adverse
modification prohibition but that would not be prohibited as takes.123

First, actions that

adversely affect currently-unoccupied habitat are highly unlikely to cause a take but could
qualify as prohibited adverse modifications. Second, actions that adversely affect habitat but
have uncertain causal connections to harm to identifiable animals could fall solely under the
adverse modification prohibition. In all likelihood, the latter class of actions, and perhaps also
the former, also would fail to trigger the jeopardy prohibition, and the adverse modification
prohibition alone would provide protection.

121

That adverse modification would not be prohibited, however, unless the farmer needed a federal permit
or funding for his actions.
122
515 U.S. at 713.
123
See also Arizona Cattle Growers’ Ass’n v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., 273 F.3d 1229, 1238 (9th Cir.
2001) (“mere habitat degradation is not always sufficient to equal harm”).
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Figure 1: The ESA’s Prohibitions
This diagram shows types of actions to which each of the ESA’s regulatory prohibitions would apply. It also
illustrates areas of potential overlap and, based on the plain language of the statute, unique application.

At first blush, these categories of actions to which the adverse modification provision alone
applies might seem trivial.124 In actuality, they are probably enormous.125 Two examples
illustrate their potential scope.
The first is climate change. Scientists know that every action that increases greenhouse
gas emissions contributes to climate change,126 and they know that climate change is a primary
threat to polar bear habitat (and habitat for thousands of other species).127 They cannot possibly
124

See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 85, at 1141 (explaining why the critical habitat provisions rarely
assume independent significance).
125
See generally Odum, supra note 10, at 728 (“Each threatened and endangered species, with a few
exceptions, owes its special status to series of small decisions.”).
126
Carbon dioxide and several other major greenhouse gases are long-lasting and well-mixed, which means
that global emissions become blended together. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE
CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 138-39 (2007). The extent of climate change therefore is largely a
function of global aggregate emissions, and any emissions that add to that aggregate level influence the extent of
change.
127
See Determination of Threatened Status for the Polar Bear (Ursus maritimus) Throughout Its Range, 73
Fed. Reg. 28212, 28292-93 (May 15, 2008); IPCC, supra note 126, at 11 (summarizing threats to species generally).
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say, however, which coal-fired power plant will kill which individual bears or what increment of
harm that new plant will cause, for all global emissions become mixed, and one can no more
explain which puffs of carbon dioxide will kill bears than one can identify a particular vote that
won a national election.128 Scientists therefore know that greenhouse gas-emitting projects are
adversely affecting critical habitat, but it is much harder to say that those projects are
jeopardizing specific species or taking identifiable individual animals. Consequently, the critical
habitat provisions alone would seem to apply to the many federal actions authorizing, permitting,
or directly causing increases in greenhouse gas emissions.
A second example involves the water quality impacts of urbanization. Many scientific
studies have documented a negative causal relationship between urban development and water
quality degradation, particularly in small urban watersheds.129 The problem is caused not just by
development adjacent to or in the waterway, but also by the increasing extent of impervious
surfaces throughout the watershed, for every new development increases pollutant loading, alters
flow patterns, and helps change the configuration of the stream.130

Assigning a specific

increment of stream degradation to one project is likely to be impossible, for stream health
usually reflects the intertwined influence of many stressors,131 and attributing jeopardy or a take
to a particular development project would be quite difficult.

But scientists can say with

confidence that each new road, mall, or subdivision degrades aquatic habitat.132 If that habitat is
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See Ruhl, supra note 54, at 17-23.
See Dave Owen, Urbanization, Water Quality, and the Regulated Landscape, 82 COLO. L. REV. __
(2011) (summarizing this research).
130
See Christopher J. Walsh et al., The Urban Stream Syndrome: Current Knowledge and the Search for a
Cure, 24 J. N. AM. BENTHOLOGICAL SOC’Y 706, 707–08 (2005); CTR. FOR WATERSHED PROTECTION, IMPACTS OF
IMPERVIOUS COVER ON AQUATIC SYSTEMS (2003).
131
See Owen, supra note 129, at __, __.
132
See COMM. ON REDUCING STORMWATER DISCHARGE CONTRIBUTIONS TO WATER POLLUTION, NAT’L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, URBAN STORMWATER MANAGEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 207 (2009) (“there is a nearuniversal negative association between biological assemblages in streams and increasing urbanization”).
129
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designated as critical—and in some parts of the country, thousands of stream miles in urbanizing
areas are so designated133—the adverse modification prohibition again should apply.
For some of the most extensive threats to species habitat, then, the adverse modification
prohibition seems to be the ESA’s primary answer. Indeed, because of this unique role, and
because of the pervasive challenges of incremental environmental degradation, it looks like one
of the most powerful and important levers in all of environmental law.

III. METHODOLOGY
While in theory the critical habitat provisions should be very important, practice and
theory can diverge. To gain a better sense of how FWS and NMFS actually implement the
critical habitat provision, I pursued a series of inquiries. Those inquiries focused on several of
the key points at which the critical habitat protections might exert some effect.
One key decision point is the consulting service’s determination about whether or not a
project will cause adverse modification or jeopardy. To track those outcomes, I reviewed
almost134 all biological opinions prepared for threatened or endangered fish species between
2005 and 2009.135 That group included 4,048 opinions.136 For each opinion, I tracked the
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See Critical Habitat Portal, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. (showing designated habitat).
Much of the designated habitat includes stream corridors in developing areas.
134
Some opinions were available on line, and the rest I obtained through Freedom of Information Act
requests. The Sacramento field office of the Fish and Wildlife Service was unable to locate nineteen biological
opinions. Several field offices in FWS’ Mountain/Prairie region chose to fill out a results table rather than directly
providing documents. The results for those Mountain/Prairie region biological opinions are included in the study,
but I have not seen the original documents. I also eliminated a few biological opinions for which the pdf files were
incomplete.
135
I limited the inquiry to fish species in an attempt to narrow the number of biological opinions. The fiveyear period post-dates the services’ abandonment of the legally flawed regulatory definition of adverse modification.
It also had the incidental benefit of including more electronically-available documents.
136
NMFS issued 2,963 of the opinions and the Fish and Wildlife Service issued 1,085. Many biological
opinion documents address more than one species, and some of those documents find jeopardy or adverse
modification for some species but not others. In determining this overall number, and in performing the calculations
described below, I counted each species-specific opinion as an independent biological opinion. Thus, if a single
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project type, action agency, species affected, jeopardy determination, adverse modification
determination, whether critical habitat had been designated for the species, and, if critical habitat
had been designated, whether the action area137 included designated critical habitat.
Because of the large pool of biological opinions, this initial review was necessarily
limited to tracking a few specific parameters. To zero in on potential effects, I then looked more
closely at three sets of biological opinions. The sets collectively contained 138 biological
opinions.

I began with coho salmon, a species with four separately-listed “evolutionarily

significant units.”138 During the study period, three of those units had designated critical habitat
and the fourth did not.139 For each biological opinion, I recorded whether the services predicted
a net positive, negative, or neutral or unclear impact on the species’ habitat;140 whether NMFS
anticipated take, and, if so, whether habitat modification was a predicted cause of take; and
whether NMFS found jeopardy or adverse modification. I also performed a qualitative review of
the conditions NMFS imposed upon the projects.141 I then completed similar comparisons for
two other species sets: first, Rio Grande silvery minnow and Gila topminnow; and then all fish
species under the jurisdiction of the FWS’s Oregon field office.142 The former two species,

document addressed one project’s impacts on four different listed species, I counted that document as four biological
opinions.
137
The services define the “action area” as the area affected by an action. It can be larger than the project
footprint. See CONSULTATION HANDBOOK, supra note 72, at 4-17.
138
See Northwest Regional Office, NOAA’s National Marine Fisheries Service, Coho Salmon
(Oncorhynchus kisutch), at http://www.nwr.noaa.gov/ESA-Salmon-Listings/Salmon-Populations/Coho/ (last
checked January 16, 2011). To avoid attributing to coho protection measures that were designed primarily to benefit
other species, I eliminated biological opinions that also included consultations on other listed species.
139
Id.
140
Some biological opinions expressed conclusions on this question, and in others the expected effect was
obvious from the analysis. If the expected net effect was not obvious or was ambiguously described, I treated the
aggregate effect as neutral or uncertain.
141
While reviewing the biological opinions, I tracked the number of RPMs imposed. But for several
reasons, I decided these numbers were not meaningful. First, an RPM is just one of the many ways in which
consultation can lead to changes in projects, see supra notes 69-77 and accompanying text, and a small number of
RPMs may just indicate that other approaches were instead being used. Second, the number of RPMs may not
correspond with their stringency. A single, simple prohibition may sometimes be more protective than a complex
set of mitigation measures.
142
I selected Oregon because the state has several fish species with critical habitat and several without.
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though handled by different FWS field offices, have somewhat similar biological needs and face
somewhat similar threats, but the Rio Grande silvery minnow has designated critical habitat
while the Gila topminnow does not.143 The latter group includes species both with and without
critical habitat, all of them addressed by one field office. My goal, again, was to assess whether
critical habitat designations correlated with any difference in the services’ approaches to habitat
protection.
Because all consultation processes occur in the shadow of judicial review, I also reviewed
cases. The set of cases addressing the adverse modification prohibition is still surprisingly small,
given the ESA’s reputation as a spawning ground for litigation, and I reviewed all cases, both
published and unpublished, available on Lexis or Westlaw.144
Finally, because I suspected that the paper record would tell only a partial story, I
interviewed FWS and NMFS staff.145 The interviewees were all biologists, most with some level
of supervisory responsibility over biological opinion preparation. All were career staff rather
than political appointees. All of the interviews were semi-structured.146 I promised anonymity
to all interviewees.
Because critical habitat is a rather controversial subject, a few words are in order about
what I did not do.

This study does not directly assess how action agencies and private
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See U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Species Profile, Rio Grande Silvery minnow (Hybognathus amarus), at
http://ecos.fws.gov/speciesProfile/profile/speciesProfile.action?spcode=E07I#crithab (last checked January 11,
2011); U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Species Profile, Gila topminnow (Poeciliopsis occidentalis), at
http://ecos.fws.gov/speciesProfile/profile/speciesProfile.action?spcode=E00C. Both species primarily inhabit
backwater and sidechannel habitats within desert river systems, and both are threatened by dewatering of rivers,
increasing pollution levels, and changes in river channel structure. See U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE,
BIOLOGICAL OPINION: ONGOING GRAZING FOR THREE ALLOTMENTS ON THE TONTO NATIONAL FOREST 10 (2009)
(describing Gila topminnow habitat needs and threats); U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, BIOLOGICAL OPINION ON
THE EFFECTS OF THE TIFFANY SEDIMENT PLUG REMOVAL 7-8, 11-12 (2005) (describing Rio Grande Silvery Minnow
habitat needs and threats to that habitat).
144
See infra Part IV.C (discussing twenty cases).
145
Most interviews were by telephone, but several biologists responded by email. One biologist distributed
the questions to all field offices in her region and then sent me a compilation of their answers, which we then
discussed in a telephone call.
146
My standard questions appear in Table 2.
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landowners respond to critical habitat designations.

I did ask agency staff about their

perceptions of the reactions of regulated parties, but my focus was on the implementation of the
provisions by the services and on review of that implementation by the courts. This study
therefore is not, and should not be interpreted as, a definitive study of the effects of critical
habitat designations, though its results should assist anyone pursuing such an inquiry.

IV. RESULTS: THE PROHIBITION IN PRACTICE
A. Jeopardy and Adverse Modification Determinations
The final product of a formal consultation process is a biological opinion, and the crux of
a biological opinion is its determination about whether the proposed action is likely to adversely
modify critical habitat or to jeopardize listed species. One key focus of my analysis therefore
was on the frequency of jeopardy and adverse modification determinations.
On this question, I was not exploring uncharted waters.

While no past study has

attempted to isolate the effect of critical habitat designations upon these outcomes, several have
reviewed the frequency of jeopardy and adverse modification determinations.147 All of these
studies have found that both jeopardy and adverse modification determinations are quite rare.
The primary reason is straightforward: the action agency and the consulting agency have many
opportunities to revise the proposed action and avoid a jeopardy or adverse modification
determination, and they usually take advantage of these opportunities.148 Who accommodates
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Houck, note 24, at 319-20; DAVID HOSKINS ET AL., FOR CONSERVING LISTED SPECIES, TALK IS
CHEAPER THAN WE THINK: THE CONSULTATION PROCESS UNDER THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT (1994); U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: TYPES AND NUMBERS OF IMPLEMENTING ACTIONS 31-32 (1992)
(“over 90 percent of the biological opinions issued by FWS/NMFS during the past 5 fiscal years have found that the
proposed action would not likely place a listed species in jeopardy”); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ENDANGERED
SPECIES: LIMITED EFFECT OF CONSULTATION REQUIREMENTS ON WESTERN WATER PROJECTS (1987).
148
See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ENDANGERED SPECIES: MORE FEDERAL MANAGEMENT ATTENTION
IS NEEDED TO IMPROVE THE CONSULTATION PROCESS 19-20 (2004) (describing measures taken by the agencies to
increase collaboration and avoid conflict during consultation processes). One biologist told me that the services
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whom in those negotiations is a more difficult question to answer; some studies assert that the
rarity of jeopardy or adverse modification decisions represents conflict avoidance primarily on
the part of the services,149 but there also is evidence that action agencies will go to great lengths
to avoid a jeopardy determination.150 Either way, the past studies do demonstrate that some
accommodation usually occurs.
Like the prior studies, I found that jeopardy and adverse modification determinations are
rare. Within the set of biological opinions that I reviewed, the FWS found jeopardy 7.2% of the
time and adverse modification for 6.6% of eligible opinions.151 Those numbers include the
opinions of a Utah field office that from 2005 through November, 2008 issued jeopardy and
adverse modifications with anomalous frequency.

With the Utah opinions eliminated, the

percentages are 2.4% and 0.083%. For NMFS, the percentages were lower: 0.54% for jeopardy
and 0.53% for adverse modification. Interestingly, the percentages were different under the
Bush and Obama administrations. From January 20, 2009 through the end of that year, neither
FWS nor NMFS issued a single jeopardy or adverse modification decision for any fish
species.152 These results suggest subtle differences between agencies and administrations,153 but

occasionally send draft jeopardy/adverse modification opinions to action agencies. Action agencies usually respond
to these draft jeopardy/adverse modification opinions by changing the project, removing the need for a jeopardy or
adverse modification determination. NMFS Biologist Interview, Nov. 16, 2010.
149
Houck, supra note 24, at 319-21.
150
See GAO, supra note 148, at 49 (“action agencies typically do quite a bit to avoid getting such an
opinion”).
151
By eligible opinions I mean opinions for species that actually have designated critical habitat.
152
I do not know why this difference exists. Possible explanations are that the Obama Administration has
discouraged jeopardy and adverse modification opinions even more than the Bush Administration did, that the
Obama Administration has encouraged action agencies to propose fewer harmful actions or to be more
accommodating of proposed changes, or that the Obama Administration is better at resolving interagency conflict.
153
The differences between NMFS and FWS in the frequency of jeopardy and adverse modification
findings are both significant at the 99% level (for jeopardy: Pearson chi-square: 155.232, degrees of freedom: 1,
P=0.000; for adverse modification Pearson chi-square: 97.575, degrees of freedom: 1, P=0.000). The differences
between NMFS and FWS in the Bush and Obama Administration are not significant at the 95% level but are
significant at the 90% level (for jeopardy: Pearson chi-square: 3.709, degrees of freedom: 1, P=0.054; for adverse
modification: Pearson chi-square: 3.714, degrees of freedom: 1, P=0.054). In other words, one can say with 90%
confidence that the Obama Administration is less likely to find adverse modification or jeopardy than the Bush
Administration.
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the essential point is that for both agencies and administrations, jeopardy and adverse
modification determinations are rare.
Table 1: Frequency of jeopardy and adverse modification determinations

Frequency of J
determinations
w/o Utah
Frequency of AM
determinations
w/o Utah
# AM determinations
w/o jeopardy
Jeopardy percentage
for species w/o CH
Jeopardy percentage
for species w/ CH
w/o Utah

NMFS
(2962 opinions total)
Total
Bush
Obama
Admin.
Admin.
0.54%
0.66%
0%

FWS
(1085 opinions total; 786 non-Utah opinions)
Total
Bush
Obama
Admin.
Admin.
7.2%
8.5%
0%

0.53%

0.68%

0%

2.4%
6.6%

2.9%
8.2%

0%
0%

0

0

0

0.083%
0

1.0%
0

0%
0

0.13%

0.15%

0%

3.7%

4%

0%

0.68%

0.87%

0%

7.9%

11%

0%

3.2%

3.9%

0%

I also evaluated how frequently an adverse modification determination played an
independent role in a negative biological opinion. As discussed above, the plain language of the
statute suggests that the adverse modification prohibition would often have independent effect,
for the set of federal actions that adversely affect habitat without clearly jeopardizing species
would seem to be quite large.154 And following the Gifford Pinchot Task Force decision,155 the
services have consistently claimed they are ignoring their regulatory definition of adverse
modification—a definition that seemed to allow some incremental degradation—and focusing
solely on the statutory language.156 But my data set did not include a single opinion in which
either NMFS or FWS found jeopardy without finding adverse modification.

Instead, the

agencies have treated the class of actions that adversely modifies habitat without also causing
jeopardy as a null set.
154

See supra notes 125-133 and accompanying text.
Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., 378 F.3d 1059, 1069-71 (9th Cir. 2004).
156
See supra notes 114-115 and accompanying text.
155
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One might hypothesize that perhaps the services were reluctant to let adverse
modification findings stand on their own, and therefore added jeopardy determinations when
they were already leaning toward adverse modification findings.

There is some statistical

evidence consistent with this hypothesis.157 NMFS did find jeopardy more frequently for species
with designated critical habitat, and the difference, while not significant at the traditional 95%
level, is significant at a 90% level.158 In interviews, a few biologists thought such an effect was
possible, whether because a critical habitat designation increased focus on habitat needs or
because the opinions’ authors were reluctant to try to explain an adverse modification finding
without an accompanying jeopardy finding.159 But other biologists expected no such effect, and
neither the interviews nor the statistics suggest that the effect, if it does exist, is anything more
than a subtle influence potentially changing a tiny percentage of outcomes.160
Closer examination of the subsets of opinions confirmed that critical habitat designations
had little effect on regulatory outcomes. In forty-four of the 138 opinions, the proposed action
was expected to have net adverse effects on habitat.161 Some of the anticipated habitat effects
seemed substantial and others minor, but by at least one key measure, almost all were
meaningful and discernable: in over eighty percent of these opinions, the service determined that
the habitat alteration would cause or contribute to “take” of the relevant listed species.162 Yet not

157

Critical habitat also may be designated more often for species in greater danger of extinction, and the
increased frequency of jeopardy determinations might reflect the gravity of threats rather than an independent effect
of critical habitat designations.
158
For the FWS, there is no statistical evidence supporting this hypothesis. With Utah opinions eliminated
from the analysis, the jeopardy percentages for species with and without critical habitat are almost the same. See
Table 1, supra.
159
See infra Table 3.
160
Id.
161
Id.
162
Several of the remaining opinions were unclear about whether habitat modification would contribute to
the take.
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one of these opinions found that the project would cause jeopardy or adverse modification, and
the presence or absence of a critical habitat designation had no apparent effect upon the outcome.
Table 2: Frequency of jeopardy, adverse modification, and take findings for selected subsets of biological opinions
Species
group

Total #
opinions

Percent
predicting
positive,
negative,
neutral
/uncertain
habitat trends

Coho (CH)

47

32% +
36% 32% ?
46% +
23% 31% =/?
56% +
39% 6% =/?

Coho (no
CH)
Rio Grande
silvery
minnow
(CH)
Gila
topminnow
(no CH)
Oregon (CH)
Oregon (no
CH)
Oregon
(mixed)
All non-CH
opinions
All CH
opinions

13
18

9
18
29
4
51
83

44% +
22% 33% =/?
56% +
39% 6% =/?
48% +
28% 24% =/?
75% +
0% 25% ?
47% +
25.5% 27.5% =/?
42% +
37% 20% =/?

J findings

AM findings

0

0

Percent (for
opinions predicting
negative habitat
trend and for all
opinions) finding
take partly or
entirely due to
habitat
modification
94% -

Percent imposing
reasonable and
prudent measures

96%
94% overall
100% -

0

0

92%
80% overall
14% -

0

0

100%
56% overall
100% -

0

0

89%
89% overall
100% -

0

0

100%
94% overall
87.5%-*

0

0

100%
66% overall
100% -

0

0

100%
75% overall
92% -*

0

0

90%
69% overall
81% -

0

0

98%
86% overall

Nor could I discern any important difference in the method of analysis. Some differences do
appear; biological opinions for projects affecting critical habitat do always include paragraphs
discussing those effects, and in the pool of opinions I reviewed closely, they also always
included a finding of no adverse modification.
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But jeopardy discussions also consistently

addressed habitat, and the adverse modification analyses often seemed like derivative
appendages to the jeopardy analyses. That appearance is entirely consistent with what one
biologist described as a prevailing attitude toward these analyses: “it’s like, oh, we have to do the
adverse mod… it’s just another thing we have to do.”163
The opinions also indicate why the agencies were never finding adverse modification,
even where projects clearly would adversely affect designated critical habitat and the effects
were of sufficient scale to harm or even kill individual animals. Quite simply, the services do
not construe the adverse modification prohibition as applying to minor alterations to habitat.
And in the 138 opinions I closely reviewed, all negative alterations were described—sometimes
convincingly, sometimes not164—as minor.

The biological opinions offered a variety of

justifications for these conclusions, but all essentially amount to the claim that the project would
only affect a small portion of the species’ critical habitat, and therefore, in the grand scheme of
things, would not really matter.165 Sometimes the biological opinions offered that rationale
163

FWS Biologist Interview, January 26, 2010.
See, e.g., NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE NORTHWEST OFFICE, BIOLOGICAL OPINION: CURRY
COUNTY ROADS DEPARTMENT AND RINGER GRAVEL MINING IN HUNTER CREEK 14-20 (2005) (finding no adverse
modification despite concluding that a project would “alter approximately 2,450 feet of streambank… used by
juvenile coho salmon as rearing habitat;” would result in “reduction in production of desirable macroinvertebrate
species in 1,500 feet of stream and a reduction in desirable prey to rearing SONC coho salmon juveniles”);
NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE NORTHWEST OFFICE, BIOLOGICAL OPINION: TIDEWATER CONTRACTORS
GRAVEL MINING, ROGUE RIVER ESTUARY 12 (2006) (finding no adverse modification for a project that “will
decrease habitat suitability and likely result in reduced use of these two acres of the river by coho salmon. The
project will disrupt the normal behavior patterns of individuals that would use these areas, and will delay the
recovery of the habitat characteristics important for high water refuge.”); BUCKMAN DIVERSION BIOLOGICAL
OPINION, supra note 116, at 42-43 (2007) (finding no adverse modification for a water project that would reduce
flows in the Rio Grande). The opinion noted that
[t]his reduction in flows contributes to an increased risk of river drying (either in timing of a
drying event or the extent of that event). Even without a drying event, the reduction in flows
affects the total wetted area, water depth, sediment transport, and structure of the aquatic habitats
(pools, runs, riffles). Reduced water quality may also be a concern, particularly as there would be
less water for dilution of waste water treatment plant (WWTP) inflows. Primary constituent
elements of designated critical habitat are also adversely affected.
Id. at 33; see also id. at 33-41 (describing in detail the impacts, which the conclusion dismissed as “minimal”).
165
In general, the services asked whether the particular project’s effects would be discernible at some
regional scale. But they rarely considered whether the project, in combination with other similar projects, would
have a discernible effect. See, e.g., NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE NORTHWEST OFFICE, BIOLOGICAL
OPINION: BOERSMA GRAVEL PIT STABILIZATION, APPLEGATE RIVER 15 (2007) (finding no adverse modification for
164
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within a few paragraphs of a cumulative effects analysis acknowledging that the species’ habitat
was being degraded, and that the degradation was occurring through the incremental effects of
small habitat alterations, but the apparent tension between their reasoning and the broader
negative trend was never acknowledged.166
The sets of biological opinions also contain a gap that indicates, perhaps more tellingly
than anything affirmatively said, the limited actual reach of the adverse modification prohibition.
Part II of this Article explained that the adverse modification prohibition would appear, on paper,
to be the ESA’s primary mechanism for addressing federal actions increasing greenhouse gas
emissions or accelerating the water quality impacts of urbanization.167 A person well-versed in
statutory requirements but somewhat naïve about practical realities therefore might expect to see
many biological opinions addressing new greenhouse gas sources and new urban
development.168 But the former type of biological opinion does not appear in either data set.
The latter type does, but far less frequently than one might expect. The services consult when
projects will abut, intrude into, or cross rivers or streams inhabited by listed species, but
development projects not directly adjacent to waterways rarely are subjected to formal

a project with negative habitat impacts “it will only affect less than 1% of the Applegate River in the Lower
Applegate River 5th Field watershed”); U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, NEW MEXICO ECOLOGICAL SERVICES
FIELD OFFICE, BIOLOGICAL OPINION: EFFECTS OF THE DRAIN UNIT 7 EXTENSION PRIORITY SITE PROJECT 20-21
(2007) (finding no adverse modification for a project with adverse habitat impacts “because the impacts will be
temporary and occur in a very small area relative to the overall critical habitat designation”).
166
See, e.g., TIDEWATER CONTRACTORS GRAVEL MINING BIOLOGICAL OPINION, supra note 164, at 16
(finding no adverse modification for a gravel mining project just after noting that “[a]s the human population in the
action area continues to grow, demand for agricultural, commercial, or residential development, as well as gravel for
roads and concrete, is also likely to grow. The effects of new development caused by that demand are likely to
reduce the conservation value of the habitat within the action area”); DRAIN UNIT 7 EXTENSION PRIORITY SITE
BIOLOGICAL OPINION, supra note 165, at 21 (finding no adverse modification for a habitat-degrading project within
a few paragraphs of noting that other activities “will continue to threaten the survival and recovery of the silvery
minnow by reducing the quantity and quality of habitat through continuation and expansion of habitat degrading
actions”).
167
See supra notes 125-133 and accompanying text.
168
Many development projects do not require federal funding or authorization and therefore would not be
covered by section 7. But many development projects do require federal wetlands permits, and federal funding also
supports lots of road building, so the set of projects potentially subject to regulatory coverage still should be large.
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consultation, notwithstanding their widely-understood impacts upon aquatic species’ habitat.169
Two major classes of activities collectively causing major habitat degradation therefore proceed
with essentially no ESA-based regulation at all.
B. Project modifications
While the jeopardy and adverse modification determinations might seem like the heart of
the biological opinion, they are not the only important component. Indeed, because of the rarity
of jeopardy and adverse modification determinations, the most important content probably lies
elsewhere. In particular, even when a biological opinion determines that a project is not likely to
adversely modify critical habitat or cause jeopardy, the opinion still will often contain a list of
modifications of and conditions for proceeding with the project. I therefore also reviewed these
modifying conditions, first to assess whether they seemed different when critical habitat was at
issue, and second to assess what they revealed about the services’ approaches to habitat
protection.
1. The prevalence of take findings and conditions
As discussed in Part II, one might expect the critical habitat provisions to provide more
habitat protection than the take provision. The take provision applies only when an action
proximately causes harm to protected animals.170

That seems to require a more complex

showing of causation than would be necessary to demonstrate an adverse modification to critical
habitat, for the latter showing would only require demonstration of harm to habitat. But even as
the services routinely decline to find adverse modification, they almost always predict that
proposed projects will cause take of listed species, and they usually find that the take will be at
169

The set of 138 closely-reviewed opinions included no consultations addressing the impacts of
impervious cover at locations removed from the waterways, even though the cumulative impacts discussion in some
of those opinions—particularly those for coho salmon—routinely identified urbanization as a threat. See, e.g.,
TIDEWATER CONTRACTORS GRAVEL MINING BIOLOGICAL OPINION, supra note 164, at 16.
170
See supra notes 117-123 and accompanying text (discussing the Sweet Home decision).
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least partly due to habitat modifications.171 Of the subset of biological opinions I reviewed in
detail, ninety-six percent anticipated take, and eighty-three percent anticipated take through
habitat modification.172 Eighty-four percent of the opinions that anticipated negative aggregate
effects on habitat found that habitat modifications would cause or contribute to takes.173 Even
when the services anticipated a net benefit to species—and quite often they did, for many of the
consultations involved restoration projects—take findings still were routine.174
The services also almost always attempted to minimize the habitat degradation that led to
take. In almost every one of the opinions that anticipated take through habitat modification, the
relevant service tried to limit that take by imposing “reasonable and prudent measures” at least
partially designed to protect habitat. They also imposed “conservation measures” to similar
effect.175

In addition to these measures, the services would often include “conservation

recommendations,” which are non-binding suggestions for additional actions that could benefit
listed species.176 And while the biological opinions did not reveal these changes, biologists told
me that the services routinely ask agencies to modify their project descriptions in ways designed
to protect species.177
The nature of those conditions varies. For some species—typically salmonids178—the
conditions are usually quite detailed, often running for several pages and containing highly
specific instructions on everything from replanting native vegetation to staffing the project with
171

See infra Table 3.
Id.
173
Id. The remaining seven opinions include one programmatic opinion, which left take findings to be
made in subsequent project-specific biological opinions, and several opinions that did not clarify whether habitat
modification was an anticipated cause of take.
174
Id.
175
See, e.g., BIOLOGICAL OPINION ON THE EFFECTS OF THE TIFFANY SEDIMENT PLUG REMOVAL, supra note
143, at 5.
176
See, e.g., id. at 27.
177
See, e.g., FWS biologist interview, December 21, 2010 (explaining that FWS’s “preference always is to
get conservation up front.”).
178
Salmonids include salmon and trout species. Collectively they account for the majority of fish-related
consultations.
172
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trained biologists.179 For other species, the conditions are much more general.180 The conditions
also varied in the extent to which they were tailored to specific sites. Some were obviously
created with one specific project in mind,181 but many reflected more generalized best
management practices for the type of project and species at issue.

Some of those best

management practices appeared to have informally evolved through a series of consultations on
similar projects, while others were memorialized in programmatic consultations or in written
interagency agreements.182
Despite that variation, one common theme emerged: the services expected many of the
conditions to provide significant benefits to the species.183 Sometimes the benefits would simply
reduce the adverse impacts of the project, but with many projects the services anticipated that
with the protective conditions in place, the project would actually benefit affected species.184
While a rigorous evaluation of the accuracy of those predictions is impossible without
monitoring data and some knowledge of the specific context of each project, and also is beyond
the competence of a legal researcher, the claims easily pass a straight-face test. Measures like
replanting shade vegetation, re-engineering stream crossings to improve fish passage, isolating
work areas, limiting work to seasons when listed fish species are less likely to be present, and
179

See, e.g., NOAA’S NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE NORTHWEST REGION, BIOLOGICAL OPINION:
EAST/WEST FORK ILLINOIS RIVER BRIDGE REPLACEMENTS PROJECT 28-37 (2005) (nine pages specifying RPMs and
implementing conditions).
180
See, e.g., BUCKMAN DIVERSION BIOLOGICAL OPINION, supra note 116, at 44-45 (specifying one RPM
with one term and condition requiring the future development of a strategy to minimize project impacts).
181
See, e.g., NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE NORTHWEST REGION, BIOLOGICAL OPINION:
MILLPORT SLOUGH BRIDGE SILETZ RIVER 36 (2009) (providing detailed specifications for eelgrass restoration to
compensate for habitat impacted by the project).
182
See, e.g., NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE NORTHWEST REGION, BIOLOGICAL OPINION: SUCKER
CREEK BRIDGE REPLACEMENT AND BANK STABILIZATION PROJECT 2 (2006) (describing conditions specified in an
earlier programmatic biological opinion); NMFS biologist interview, November 16, 2010 (explaining that more than
half of their consultations use standardized conditions, and describing this as a “very fruitful way to go” because of
administrative efficiencies and because action agencies were willing to accept highly protective conditions).
183
E.g. NMFS Biologist Interview, November 16, 2010 (describing some of the conditions as “pretty much
bombproof”).
184
See, e.g., NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE, NORTHWEST REGION, CONFERENCE OPINION: FALL
CREEK CULVERT AND BRIDGE PROJECT (2005) (biological opinion for a roadway project coupled with substantial
efforts to improve fish passage).
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requiring trained fish biologists to observe project implementation185 all seem likely to provide
real benefits to species.186
2. The slight (but evolving) importance of critical habitat
The preceding discussion clearly demonstrates that section 7 consultations lead to habitat
protection. But I found little evidence that critical habitat designations make any difference in
the level of protection.
In reviewing biological opinions, I found no difference in approach for species with
critical habitat and species without. For both categories of species, the agencies allowed habitatdegrading projects to proceed; for both categories, they imposed conditions designed to reduce,
but not always eliminate, the extent of habitat impacts; for both categories, they used
conservation requirements and reasonable and prudent measures to adjust projects; and within
both categories the level of detail in the conditions varied. But a limited quantitative analysis
reveals no clear trends,187 and qualitatively, the variations seem more closely related to species
type and office location than to the critical habitat designation. Perhaps most tellingly, the
biological opinions never mentioned protecting critical habitat as an independent justification for
imposing conditions. My analysis does not prove that the conditions imposed for species with
critical habitat and those imposed for species without are the same, for there could be subtle
distinctions that a primarily-qualitative comparison would not pick up.

But I found no

affirmative documentary evidence that the agencies were using distinct approaches.
The interviews nevertheless suggested that critical habitat designations have some
effects. Some, though not all, of the biologists believed that critical habitat designations slightly
185

See, e.g., id. at 2-5, 23-30 (describing these and many other measures).
The extent of the benefit is uncertain, however. See Lyman L. McDonald et al., Monitoring and
Evaluation: Salmon Restoration in the Columbia River Basin, in RETURN TO THE RIVER: RESTORING SALMON TO
THE COLUMBIA RIVER 571, 588 (Richard N. Williams ed. 2006) (noting uncertainties about restoration activities)
187
See Table 2, supra.
186
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increased the likelihood that action agencies would engage in informal consultation prior to
proceeding with projects. Some, though again not all, of the biologists thought that the process
of designating critical habitat spurred the services to think more carefully about species’ habitat
needs, and that the resulting additional knowledge could help them develop more protective
conditions. Many of the biologists thought that a critical habitat designation gave the services
more leverage to negotiate habitat conditions.188 With one exception,189 none of the biologists
thought the changes were large, and any assertion of major across-the-board effects would be
difficult to reconcile with the biological opinions. But all thought that subtle effects do exist.

188

E.g. E-mail from FWS biologist to author, November 24, 2010 (“The CH designation helped bring
everyone to the table and gave me better leverage to negotiate some significant avoidance measures.”).
189
See NMFS Biologist interview, November 22, 2010 (stating the designations gave her “a stronger arm
going into negotiations… it makes a really big difference.”).
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Table 3: Summary of agency biologist responses190
Question
Do you think CH
designations affect the
frequency with which
action agencies engage in
informal consultations?
Do you think CH
designations make
projects more likely to
proceed to formal
consultation?
Do you think CH
designations affect the
choice of conservation
measures?
Do you think CH
designations affect the
choice of RPMs?
Do you think CH
designations affect the
choice of RPAs?
Do you think CH
designations increase the
likelihood of jeopardy
determinations?
Do you think CH
designations affect
outcomes in other ways?

Have you seen a change
over time in the ways in
which CH designations
affect implementation?

Answers by the
numbers
Yes: 2
Yes, slightly: 4
Possibly: 2
No: 7

Representative answers
- A few biologists thought designations sensitize action agencies
to effects on habitat, leading to more consultations
- Several biologists perceived a change in the frequency of
informal consultations for unoccupied habitat

Yes: 2
Yes, slightly: 3
Possibly: 2
No: 8

- Several biologists mentioned consultations for unoccupied
habitat
- One biologist who said “no” noted that she was starting to
question that approach

Yes: 5
Maybe: 2
Occasionally: 3
No: 5

- People are “more willing to negotiate and mitigate”
- “It makes a really big difference.”
- “Maybe, but not much”
- “In any section 7 consultation, we strive to protect the species
and the ecosystem it depends upon.”
- Many biologists asserted that RPMs should focus on mitigating
take, not on independently protecting critical habitat
- Two biologists who said “no” thought that might change

Yes: 1
Possibly, or
occasionally: 2
No: 11
Yes: 3
- If an RPA came specifically out of an adverse modification
It should: 1
determination, that would be a big deal
Maybe: 1
No: 7
No experience: 3
Yes: 4
- Some biologists thought designations increase focus on habitat,
Maybe: 2
which could change the outcome of the jeopardy analysis;
Hard to say: 1
- Others argued that the jeopardy analysis was always focused on
No: 5
habitat and expected no change in outcomes
No experience: 3
- They focus attention on particularly important areas
- They help the services develop a better understanding of habitat needs
- They cause actors “to take the ESA a little more seriously”
- They create the inaccurate impression that non-designated areas are unimportant
- “Critical habitat has proved to be useful in negotiating regional conservation
strategies for section 10(a)(1)(B) permits”
- Yes; it’s an “evolving concept”
- More internal scrutiny of adverse modification questions
- Greater willingness to designate unoccupied habitat
- Biologists are increasingly able to get project proponents to change projects; “it
didn’t used to be that way.”
- No, it’s still not that important in my region

190

This table should be read with a few caveats in mind. First, I did not ask for specific yes/no/I don’t
know answers, and as a consequence the categories for the “by the numbers” column reflect the range of answers I
received. Second, representative comments that do not appear in quotes are paraphrased. Third, one regional office
provided me an email combining the responses of multiple biologists in several field offices, and I have treated that
as a single response. In short, this is a sampling of views, not a formal survey.
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C. Adverse modification in the courts
Consultation processes occasionally culminate in litigation, and the courts therefore help
determine the effect of the adverse modification prohibition. Judicial influence has been the
focus of much of the previous legal literature on critical habitat,191 and from those analyses
several hypotheses have emerged.

Some commentators have argued that critical habitat

designations are essentially inconsequential for judicial review,192 while others have suggested
that they add teeth to judicial review of no-jeopardy opinions.193 Interestingly, most legal
commentators agree that judicial review of the adverse modification prohibition has little
significance except to the extent it bolsters the jeopardy review.194 To test these hypotheses, and
to assess what effect judicial review might be creating, I also reviewed the body of caselaw
addressing adverse modification.
The most striking quality of that body of caselaw is its small size. Academic and popular
descriptions sometimes portray the consultation process as hopelessly embroiled in litigation,195
a characterization that tracks a broader view of the ESA.196 For decisions to list species and to
designate critical habitat, that characterization has ample factual basis.197 But for the entire
191

See, e.g., Houck, supra note 24, at 311 (“the ESA's prohibitions against jeopardy and habitat
degradation are enforced solely through citizen actions in the courts”).
192
See, e.g., Robert J. Scarpello, Note: Statutory Redundancy: Why Congress Should Overhaul the
Endangered Species Act to Exclude Critical Habitat Designation, 30 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 399, 413 (2003).
193
Salzman, supra note 25, at 323, 324-27; Houck, supra note 24, at 310 (“the ESA's prohibition on
modification of critical habitat is interpreted by courts as strong and unyielding; the prohibition on jeopardy is
viewed as discretionary and flexible. Moreover, the absence of designated critical habitat makes a case based on
jeopardy highly problematical—if not insurmountable.”); Josh Thompson, Comment: Critical Habitat Under the
Endangered Species Act: Designation, Re-Designation, and Regulatory Duplication, 58 ALA. L. REV. 885, 890
(2007).
194
Salzman, supra note 25, at 324-27; Scarpello, supra note 192, at 413 (“there does not appear to be any
case where a court found “adverse modification” of a critical habitat without also finding “jeopardy” to a listed
species”).
195
See, e.g., Jamison Colburn, The Indignity of Federal Wildlife Habitat Law, 57 ALA. L. REV. 417, 443
(2005) (asserting that consultation occurs in the shadow of “the inevitable court challenge”).
196
See, e.g., David J. Hayes, A Lack of Leadership on all Sides, 21 ENVTL. F. 46, 46 (2004) (lamenting
“litigators—rather than dealmakers—dominating the ESA landscape of late.”).
197
See, e.g., Testimony of Craig Manson, Assistant Secretary for Fish and Wildlife and Parks,
U.S. Department of the Interior, Before the House Committee on Resources, Regarding H.R. 3824, The Threatened
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thirty-eight year history of the ESA, Lexis and Westlaw combined contain only twenty decisions
invoking the adverse modification prohibition to challenge federal agency actions.198 Not every
litigated matter produces a judicial decision, and not all judicial decisions are published on Lexis
or Westlaw. But with the 2005-2009 period producing over 4,000 biological opinions just for
fish species, twenty judicial opinions for all species over the entire life of the statute seems a
rather small number.199 The overwhelming majority of adverse modification decisions are not
litigated, and the extent of judicial oversight over most consultation processes is surprisingly
minimal.
The few decisions that do exist call into question the prior hypotheses about judicial
review of adverse modification decisions. First, several commentators, observing that no court
had ever set aside a no-adverse-modification determination without also setting aside a nojeopardy determination, asserted that the adverse modification inquiry had assumed no
independent significance for judicial review.200 Those observations were generally accurate
when written, but more recent cases undermine the claim. Courts have set aside no-adverse-
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modification determinations, finding both errors of law and conclusions unsupported by factual
evidence, without also setting aside no-jeopardy determinations.201 Even when courts have
rejected both no-adverse-modification and no-jeopardy determinations, or have upheld both, they
have often—though not always—analyzed the two issues independently.202 And, interestingly,
plaintiffs have done rather well, winning fifteen of the twenty adverse modification cases. The
overall body of cases remains too small to support definitive conclusions about judicial
approaches, but at the very least, the cases indicate that courts usually ascribe independent
procedural and substantive significance to the ESA’s adverse modification requirements.
Second, the judicial decisions provide little support for the assertion that critical habitat
designations add stringency to judicial review of no-jeopardy determinations. The authors who
developed this hypothesis did so by evaluating a few early consultation cases.203 They found that
in cases involving designated critical habitat, no-jeopardy determinations were set aside, while in
some others not involving critical habitat, those no-jeopardy determinations were upheld.
Initially, those older cases provide thin support for the conclusion. In most of the cases where
jeopardy determinations were set aside, the factual circumstances were remarkable, with
agencies proposing actions that posed extraordinary threats to listed species’ survival.204
Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, the seminal snail darter case, is a good example; the proposed
dam was expected to obliterate the species, and the jeopardy prohibition clearly prohibits such an
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action even absent a critical habitat designation.205 Those compelling fact patterns, rather than
some subliminal effect of a critical habitat designation, provide a simpler explanation for the
results.206 Moreover, at least in the set of decisions available on Lexis or Westlaw, no court has
ever actually stated that a critical habitat designation changed the outcome of its jeopardy
analysis.207 If the designations did so matter, one would expect a court to say so.
The cases therefore demonstrate that critical habitat can hold independent significance for
judicial review, and does not just stiffen the jeopardy review. But the courts hold mixed views
on how much critical habitat matters, particularly when incremental habitat degradation is at
issue. In several decisions, courts have questioned the services’ willingness to allow incremental
habitat degradation, often criticizing the agencies’ failure to acknowledge the relationship
between incremental degradation and cumulative harm.208 But in several other decisions, courts
have allowed no-adverse-modification determinations to stand even where the projects were
expected to degrade habitat.209
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No case better illustrates this latter approach than the Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in
Butte Environmental Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.210 There, the court considered a
challenge to a proposed development project that would allow the filling of wetlands designated
as critical habitat.211 A significant area surrounding the wetlands also was designated as critical
habitat, and the project would impact that area is well.212 In total, according to FWS, “the
proposed development would destroy 234.5 acres of… critical habitat” of two endangered
animal species.213 A listed plant species also was present, and 242.2 acres of its habitat “would
be destroyed.”214 The court emphasized that these areas represented less than one percent of the
total designated critical habitat of each species, but, as it also acknowledged, “the proposed
project would contribute to a local and range-wide trend of habitat loss and degradation.”215
The FWS nevertheless issued no-adverse-modification and no-jeopardy determinations, and the
lawsuit ensued. As the Ninth Circuit’s opinion makes clear, no question existed that the project
would destroy hundreds of acres of critical habitat, and no one could dispute that the ESA
expressly forbids federal agencies from approving actions likely to “destroy or adversely
modify” critical habitat.216

But the court allowed the action to proceed.217

“The FWS's

determination” the court concluded, “that critical habitat would be destroyed was thus not
inconsistent with its finding of no ‘adverse modification.’ After all, the project would affect only
a very small percentage of the total critical habitat.”218
D. Summarizing critical habitat’s role
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Id. at 579.
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The foregoing discussion suggests that critical habitat designations have little effect upon
consultation processes and only modest effects upon judicial review. The effects are not nonexistent; the adverse modification prohibition has affected the outcome of several cases, even if a
gap exists between the requirements articulated by the statute and those enforced by the courts.
Agency biologists involved in consultation processes thought that critical habitat designations
affect negotiations between the services and action agencies. But the effects of critical habitat
designations upon the regulators and upon judicial review still have been minor.
That does not mean that critical habitat is unimportant. Even if designations result in
little additional regulatory constraint, they send signals to action agencies and to private entities.
Unlike the listing of a species, which signals the possibility of ESA-related regulatory constraints
only if one knows where the species is likely to live, lines on a map are easy to understand, and
designations therefore can help landowners and action agencies avoid conflict with species
needs.219

Even if critical habitat does not substantially change the services’ regulatory

approaches, regulated entities seem to believe that designations do increase regulatory
stringency, and that belief may also deter some activities that might otherwise harm species.220
And designations may affect the regulatory approaches of other environmental agencies by
providing a signal that some habitats are particularly important.221 The signals are not uniformly
beneficial to species. The agencies have complained that when designations are finalized, nondesignated habitat actually becomes harder to protect,222 and one study has suggested that
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proposed designations can spur preemptive conversion of habitat.223 The extent of these effects
also is far from certain and is a worthy subject for additional research. But most of the biologists
I interviewed agreed that providing a warning about the presence of listed species does promote
those species’ protection.
In addition, the process of designating critical habitat can provide information that helps
the services implement other statutory requirements. That process currently includes an effort to
identify some of the species’ key habitat needs.224 While some of that information already may
be available to agency staff—the agencies routinely consider habitat threats in listing decisions
and jeopardy analyses—several biologists told me that the critical habitat designation process
leads to a more thorough and rigorous analysis of habitat needs.225 The resulting information
then can help the agencies as they engage in consultations, develop recovery plans, negotiate
habitat conservation plans, and target spending to conservation and recovery projects.226
In short, critical habitat does matter. But critical habitat has not yet mattered in quite the
ways or to quite the extent that the statutory language would lead one to expect. That could
change, of course, and several biologists thought that regulatory protection of critical habitat
would evolve. But to date, any perception of substantially increased regulatory protection for
species, or of heightened regulatory burdens for regulated entities, is mostly a mirage.

V. HABITAT PROTECTION AND THE NARRATIVES OF THE ESA
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So far, this Article may read like an attempt to document a scandal. A core axiom of our
administrative law system—indeed, our legal system—is that agencies should implement the law
as it is written.227 Administrative policy disagreements with legal requirements are no basis for
non-implementation, at least in the view of most scholars and judges,228 for we are, we tell
ourselves, a nation run by “a government of laws, not of men.”229 With critical habitat, that
faithful implementation has not happened. The services have provided substitute protections, but
to many commentators, the mitigation measures and conditions will seem rather unimpressive—
the sops thrown out by an administrative law system “geared,” as one scholar recently put it,
“almost entirely to the legalization of natural resource damage.”230 Other readers may be
tempted to draw a rather different conclusion. They may see the agencies’ efforts as attempts—
partial and perhaps futile—to inject some restraint into a crazy law that, if faithfully
implemented, would impose remarkably rigid constraints across much of the American
landscape.231
These conclusions would lead in almost entirely opposite directions, except for one
shared conviction: in both narratives, the existing system of endangered species protection is
deeply flawed and requires fundamental reforms. Yet this Part argues that both narratives are at
best incomplete. There are significant problems with existing regulatory approaches, and Part VI
explains how those problems might be addressed. But there is also much to commend in those
existing approaches. This section therefore explains why, despite what may initially seem like
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empirical evidence of agency malfeasance, this study provides little support for some of the
prevalent cynicism about ESA implementation and, more generally, about environmental and
administrative law, and why the reforms I propose involve selective tinkering rather than a
comprehensive overhaul.
A. The persistence of flexibility
At a press conference in 2008, then-Secretary of Interior Dirk Kempthorne referred to the
Endangered Species Act as “perhaps the least flexible law Congress has ever enacted.”232 This
was not a new claim. For years, the ESA’s many political and academic critics have argued that
it creates an unreasonably rigid regulatory scheme.233 Many critics contrast that flawed rigidity
with administrative reforms or alternative regulatory approaches designed to introduce more
creativity, negotiation, flexibility, and decentralization to the regulatory process.234 All of those
critiques track some of the broader narratives of environmental law.

Both political and

academic critics often assert that traditional regulatory approaches are too top-down, rigid, and
insensitive to local conditions, that they are ultimately antithetical to the sort of innovation an
effective legal regime should promote, and that they should be dramatically reformed.235
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The claim that the ESA is rigidly implemented is impossible to reconcile with the
agencies’ actual track record. Every study to consider the section 7 process has found that
jeopardy and adverse modifications are rare, and that even when the services do find jeopardy or
adverse modification, projects still generally proceed.236 My study confirms those prior results,
and adds two additional findings. First, even when projects are clearly expected to degrade
critical habitat and to take listed species, jeopardy and adverse modification determinations are
still very infrequent.237 Moreover, that rarity has persisted despite a series of cases successfully
challenging regulations authorizing permissive approaches.238

Second, for some classes of

actions with major habitat impacts, formal consultation happens hardly at all.239
The ESA does still impose procedural and substantive constraints on many individual
projects, but the nature of those constraints undermines some of the classic critiques of the ESA.
Those conventional critiques often assert that the ESA, and federal environmental law generally,
are insensitive to local conditions.240 But actual biological opinions reveal that both FWS and
NMFS usually try to craft location-specific protective measures.241 Rather than evolving through
the top-down edicts of insulated bureaucrats in Washington, those measures originate at regional
or field offices, usually through ongoing negotiations with regulated entities.242
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generalized standards do evolve,243 but again the process is often bottom-up and negotiationdriven, with field or regional office biologists working with frequently regulated agencies to
develop standards for particular classes of projects.244
This process is not cost-free, of course.245 Consultation takes time, and project conditions
require money to implement. But the scheme is implemented in cost-sensitive ways. First, the
constant use of negotiations provides opportunities to identify mitigation measures with
relatively low financial cost and relatively high environmental returns. Second, the selective but
frequent use of generic standards suggests that action agencies and the services are sensitive to
the tradeoff between more broadly-applicable standards, which can provide greater predictability
for project designers and can expedite the consultation process, and site specific conditions,
which can provide more carefully tailored protection, and are attempting to manage that tradeoff
in a manner that balances cost-reduction and environmental protection.246
The process also offers some opportunities for learning, adaptation, and regulatory
evolution. Because the services repeatedly interact with the same agencies,247 and because they
routinely require monitoring of the implementation of their projects and of direct takes of
species, they have created mechanisms for feedback.248 These mechanisms are far from perfect.
Biological opinions rarely require contributions to species population or distribution monitoring,
243
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even though such monitoring which might provide important data for developing broader
conservation and protection strategies.249 The agencies also never have followed through on a
proposal laid out in their consultation handbook, which calls for the creation of a centralized
database of monitoring results.250 Agency biologists told me that the actual extent of compliance
monitoring is uneven.251 But the agencies are gathering some data and are creating some
opportunities for dialogue and learning, and that is an important start. Agency staff thought that
dialogue and learning was paying dividends; in interviews, several biologists explained ways that
their approaches to mitigation were evolving and improving over time.252
In short, ESA implementation already involves many of the approaches that would-be
reformers suggest are necessary to an effective regulatory scheme, and it involves those elements
despite the persistence of an old-style regulatory structure. To someone who argues that the
ESA’s basic goals are not worthwhile, that may be small consolation, but many of the critiques
of the ESA focus on means rather than ends, and the means are more sensible than many of the
critics acknowledge.253 There is enough room for creativity and flexibility within existing
approaches to accommodate many of the flexibility-oriented reformers’ stated goals.
B. The absence of capture254
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This Article is by no means the first to challenge the common view that the ESA is a
rigidly-implemented statute, or that environmental law generally is inflexibly implemented by
bureaucratic zealots. For decades, some commentators have argued that the ESA actually is
quite pliable—excessively so, some say—in practice.255 Perhaps the most eloquent advocate of
this view is Oliver Houck, who once argued that “[a] handful of piers for powerboats in
designated critical habitat areas aside, there is no evidence that formal consultation under the
Endangered Species Act is stopping the world. Indeed, there is little evidence that it is changing
it very much at all.”256

In Houck’s widely-shared view, the implementing agencies have

responded to intense political pressure by reading rigid mandates out of the statute and
interpreting it as largely discretionary.257 They then have invoked that discretion to avoid
imposing meaningful regulatory control.258 Some of these critics are more sanguine about the
ESA’s protective force, but they still argue that it protects listed species only because the facial
rigidity of its mandates means that even a watered-down version of the ESA still holds
substantial force.259 In short, while the unsympathetic critics view the ESA as the poster child
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for regulatory rigidity run amok, many sympathetic critics view it as a classic study in regulatory
accommodation and capture.
The evidence that this dynamic sometimes exists is overwhelming,260 and this study
provides some new support for this view. Most importantly, a central conclusion of this study is
that the adverse modification prohibition has barely been implemented, and that the services
have eschewed faithful application of the statute in favor of a more discretionary approach that
often allows projects to degrade designated critical habitat.261 The capture-and-accommodation
hypothesis provides a plausible explanation for that choice. Similarly, both individual biological
opinions and individual court cases demonstrate that the agencies sometimes adopt strained
reasoning in support of no-adverse-modification decisions, sometimes in response to
acknowledged political pressure.262 That strained reasoning suggests a vigorous effort to avoid
imposing regulatory constraints. Though these machinations may sometimes seem remarkable,
the motivation behind them is not hard to understand. No one could credibly dispute that the
political pressures against species protection are persistent and intense.
But much of the evidence produced by this study does not comport with assertions that
the services are captured agencies. Most importantly, that evidence indicates that the services
are using the ESA to change thousands of proposed projects. Even as they have allowed the
critical habitat protections to languish, they have consistently been finding that proposed projects
will “take” species and have been imposing “reasonable and prudent measures,” many of which
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appear extensive and meaningful, upon almost all of the projects they review.263 Though those
“reasonable and prudent measures” are sometimes minimal or hortatory, the services have
multiple other ways, all frequently used, to minimizing projects’ adverse effects, and often to
change projects so that they provide net benefits for species’ habitat.264 Compared to a baseline
of complete ESA implementation, the results may seem disappointing, but they still represent
much more environmental protection than the services would ever accomplish if they really were
acting only in response to litigation—which, as discussed above, is relatively rare.
The time involved in consultation processes also provides an indication that the agencies
are not pushover regulators. Though biologists told me ways they had tried to expedite the
consultation process, none suggested that they were doing so at the expense of species
protection, and particularly for complex projects, the consultation process can last months or
even years.265 Nor did any of the biologists I spoke with fit the model of a captured bureaucrat.
Instead, I heard consistent commitment to the underlying statutory goal of species protection,
and consistent description of the ways biologists tried to fulfill that commitment. The biologists
believe, as one put it, that under section 7 they “have a lot of flexibility to do things that are good
for species,”266 and that they are actively putting that flexibility to use. They were aware, of
course, of the political controversies associated with the ESA, and some acknowledged ways in
which those pressures affected their work.267 Some also expressed frustration with what they
perceived as a failure to develop the concept of adverse modification or to use it to its full
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potential.268 They were similarly aware of the influence of litigation upon implementation; in
fact, several mentioned that Gifford Pinchot Task Force and related cases had compelled (or
empowered) the services to rethink their approach to critical habitat.269 But both interviews and
documentary evidence demonstrate that a public choice-based theory of administrative
governance, in which the services simply respond to the balance of power created by
development interests’ lobbying and environmental groups’ lawsuits, misses a key part of the
story. Instead, a meaningful regulatory effort comes from within the agencies.
The core point of this discussion is not that the existing approaches to habitat protection
are wonderful and in no need of change. A regulatory approach that diverges from statutory
requirements obviously is problematic, particularly if the divergence threatens to undermine
achievement of the basic statutory goal of removing species from the list.

That potential

divergence is not just harmful to species; for potentially regulated entities, recovery means a
respite from some of the regulatory stringency of the ESA, and therefore ought to bring
significant economic benefits. But even with those caveats, the services’ efforts support an
unconventionally positive view of at least part270 of the existing regulatory scheme.

That

regulatory scheme already has given those agencies useful tools to work with, and the agencies
have used those tools in creative, pragmatic, and, often, effective ways. With modest reforms—
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none of them actually requiring legislative changes—providing more effective tools, the services
could do even better.

VI. CRITICAL HABITAT AND THE CHALLENGES OF INCREMENTAL DEGRADATION
The preceding discussion indicates that the services are using the ESA to provide
substantial habitat protection. Yet, paradoxically, a gap persists between the statutory mandate
and actual agency practice. This section considers why that gap exists, how reforms might
address it, and what the gap and its potential fixes reveal about the challenges of regulating small
environmental harms.
A. The dilemma and the critical habitat response
Any effort to regulate incremental environmental degradation must address a crucial
question: when are harms too small to trigger regulation?271 Yet neither the ESA itself, which
suggests a stringent and prohibitory regulatory system, nor the services, which have taken a more
permissive course, have developed an effective response.
This dilemma is difficult to resolve partly because each of the obvious answers is flawed.
One possibility is to try to prohibit every contribution to the environmental problem, no matter
how small. But in practice, the administrative costs of such an approach could be extraordinary,
the burdens imposed might outweigh any environmental gain, and both the regulators and the
regulated would likely resist implementation.272 Alternatively, regulators might prohibit only
those actions that cause major harm (or prohibit nothing at all). But if the environmental
problem is primarily caused by small actors, a regulatory approach focusing only on a few major
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See, e.g., Madeline June Kass, The NEPA Climate Paradox: Taking Greenhouse Gases into Account in
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compliance).
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See id. at 71.
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actors will solve little.273 Moreover, any system that distinguishes between regulated “large”
contributors and unregulated “small” ones faces a line-drawing problem. Environmental harms
often exist on a continuum of scales, and if there is no clear distinction between small and large
harms, any line will seem somewhat arbitrary.274 The distinction is even harder to draw if, as is
often the case, no one knows how much harm each action will cause.275
This problem has been the Achilles heel of critical habitat protection. The statute itself
suggests a very low regulatory threshold, under which the services would prohibit any federallyapproved worsening of critical habitat, no matter how minor.276 But without some creative
additional measures, such an approach cannot work.

The services already are politically

embattled and administratively swamped—“barely keeping our heads above water,” as one
biologist put it—and it is difficult to imagine them performing individualized consultations on,
let alone vetoing, many additional projects.277 Congress, which has preferred using its power of
the purse to undercut ESA implementation, is unlikely to appropriate the funds necessary to
support a larger workload.278

The political backlash against more extensive regulatory

prohibitions also would almost certainly be intense.

Unsurprisingly, the services have not

embraced this approach, and they have sometimes assured the world that they never will.279
Instead, they have chosen to prohibit a few major habitat modifications, to allow more minor
modifications to proceed subject to conditions, to let other modifications proceed without any
273
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regulation at all, and to use a case-by-case approach to drawing the lines. That approach has
several positive features—in practice, it functions rather similarly to the sort of feasibility-based
performance standards that air and water quality regulators have successfully relied upon280—
and it limits regulatory overreach, but it substitutes other problems.
First, the services’ chosen approach necessitates distinguishing among levels of harm,
and the services have struggled to define, let alone justify, the lines. Their regulations and
guidance use fuzzy terms that simply suggest that thresholds might exist.281 The services now
disclaim reliance on even those vague regulations and have not put forth any sort of generalized
standard in their place.282 Nor have the courts set forth any sort of standard.283 As a practical
matter, individual field offices and individual courts have been left to find thresholds on an ad
hoc basis. Their choices have often been permissive, and their justifications sometimes seem
premised on the dubious assumption that small harms pose no real threat to species.284
The services’ chosen approach also may be insufficiently protective. Recovering species
is a core goal of the ESA, and for good reason; if a species recovers, the environmental goals of
the statute are served and regulated entities should face reduced regulatory burdens, for they will
no longer be subject to the ESA’s procedural and substantive constraints. But if a species was
listed primarily because of the threat of habitat degradation—and, with most species, that was a
primary, if not the primary, threat285—then allowing additional habitat degradation is
fundamentally inconsistent with that goal. With some species, the harmful projects may not be
creating an overall negative trend, for the services consistently impose protective conditions,
280
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some sufficiently protective to avoid any negative habitat impact, and the public funds many
restoration projects.286 But in the absence of a rigorous effort to relate individual consultation
outcomes to broader species trends, it is very difficult to know if the services are doing
enough.287 And even if their efforts are producing positive trends, they are doing so by shifting
to a subset of regulated projects—and, to a large extent, to the taxpayer—the burden of
compensating for the many projects that escape the adverse modification prohibition.
If critical habitat protection is to assume greater significance, and if the gap between the
services’ implementation approach and statutory requirements is to be reduced, if not closed, the
services and the courts must resolve this regulatory thresholds dilemma. They need not throw
out everything about their existing approaches, for, as discussed above, they already are
accomplishing quite a lot through their attempts to minimize each project’s impacts. But they do
need a few additional tools. The discussion below explains two promising possibilities.288
1. Low thresholds and off-site mitigation
While reviewing biological opinions, I found very few uses of off-site mitigation to
compensate for on-site environmental impacts.289 If a project was going to degrade location A,
the services generally imposed conditions to minimize (and sometimes eliminate) that
286
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degradation at location A, but they did not require compensatory restoration work at location B.
Individual biologists did mention using this approach, but not extensively, and in their
experience it was relatively new.290 In taking this approach, they were working with little
direction or guidance. The services’ joint consultation regulations say nothing about off-site
mitigation, and their consultation handbook does not prescribe any such approach, let alone
provide guidance for its implementation.
This is a lukewarm embrace of a practice now standard in many other areas of
environmental law.291 Off-site mitigation is now a core part of wetlands protection.292 Offset
programs, under which new pollution sources in non-attainment areas must pay existing sources
to reduce their emissions, are specifically prescribed by the Clean Air Act.293 Off-site mitigation
is even common practice in “habitat conservation plans” prepared pursuant to ESA section 10.294
In the view of many environmental scholars, these trading regimes are both economically and
environmentally preferable to traditional regulatory approaches, and, according to some
commentators, their emergence has been a crucially important step in the maturation of
environmental law.295
Despite their growing prevalence, these trading approaches have their detractors. Critics
have argued that in practice, off-site mitigation often has meant trading ecologically valuable
natural systems for dysfunctional artificial substitutes.296 More broadly, critics argue that in
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practice, trading schemes are excessively complex and often involve trading real environmental
degradation for fictional environmental gains.297

And even though trading programs are

designed to reduce opposition to environmental regulation, they rarely eliminate it. Even with
mitigation programs in place, regulated entities have still chafed at the extent of environmental
regulation and have taken their frustrations as far as the Supreme Court, with some success.298
The critics raise important points, but the critical habitat experience shows that in the
absence of an offsite trading program, many small environmental harms will simply escape
regulatory coverage. If a project has significant non-environmental social utility—if, to use an
example cited by one NMFS biologist, it is a small repair that will allow an important existing
roadway to remain functional299—but will unavoidably harm a small habitat area, a biologist
must choose between enforcing the letter of the statute at significant social (and, potentially,
political) cost or, alternatively, allowing habitat degradation to proceed without mitigation. It is
not hard to imagine what most biologists will choose. Yet those same impacts might be cheaply
mitigated, perhaps by contributing to a dam removal, wetlands restoration project, or purchase of
environmental water rights elsewhere on the same river, and the action agency and project
proponent might be willing to support those efforts as a condition for proceeding with the
project. Designing such an off-site mitigation program is no easy task; the extensive critiques of
existing programs amply demonstrate that mitigation trading programs require careful design and
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oversight.300 But for critical habitat protection, even modestly effective mitigation efforts should
improve upon the status quo.
2. Planning and standardized threshold-setting
Another distinctive feature of the services’ current approach is its ad-hoc, project-byproject selection of regulatory thresholds. As of this writing, the services have no regulation or
even guidance that defines the line between adverse modification and permissible habitat
degradation. Nor do they have any process, outside of individual consultations, for drawing that
distinction. Agency biologists do discuss the question; several biologists told me that these
questions are often debated in what one described as “geeky section 7 coordinator circles.”301
But none of the biologists felt that the services had resolved the issue, and opinions varied about
what the standard should be.302 To add to the challenge, current agency regulations and guidance
place partial blinders on biologists seeking to resolve this question.

When conducting

consultations, the services may not consider the cumulative impacts of other future projects also
subject to consultation.303
That approach places field biologists in difficult positions. To determine whether an
individual project contributes significantly to a larger problem, a field biologist would need to
understand the impacts of the full set of activities likely to affect the species. For a biologist
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swamped with consultation deadlines and struggling to get through the day’s work,304 stepping
back and performing that kind of broader analysis is likely to be impossible, particularly if
agency guidance tells that biologist to ignore many future projects.305 In the absence of that
broader perspective, and without the backing of a centralized policy on cumulative impacts, a
decision to impose a prohibitive regulatory regime on a project with seemingly minor impacts
will be very difficult to make.306 Occasionally agency biologists will be willing to do so, but it
should be no surprise if often they are not.
Again, other environmental laws offer better alternatives, with the most robust example
coming from air quality planning. Every year, air quality planners in non-attainment zones
across the country confront a challenge like the habitat degradation problems faced the FWS and
NMFS.307 Rarely is regional air quality determined by the emissions from a single facility.
Instead, air pollution problems typically derive from the collective emissions of many factories,
power plants, roads, and other sources.308 Those emissions often interact in complex and nonlinear ways.309 Consequently, determining on an ad-hoc, project-by-project basis what level of
emissions should trigger regulation would be nearly impossible, and the Clean Air Act does not
ask anyone to try. It instead compels states to develop “state implementation plans” that address
all emission sources, and it only allows approval of plans that simulation models predict will
304
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attain the ultimate air quality goal.310 The contrast to the project-by-project section 7 approach is
dramatic.
This comprehensive approach presents several obvious advantages. First, rather than
addressing each individual action in an analytical vacuum, it gives planners an opportunity to
consider the aggregate consequence of all of the actions threatening to cause environmental
degradation. Second, it compels them to think through the implications of setting regulatory
thresholds at a particular level.

If those thresholds are set too high, and the modeling is

reasonably accurate,311 the model will not predict attainment, and the planners must return to the
drawing board.312 Third, that approach gives regulators opportunities to develop programs to
compensate if they do choose to set regulatory thresholds that exempt some contributors.313 If
regulators decide that regulating some low-level emitters is not worth the effort, they can change
the stringency of other regulatory programs to compensate for that selective non-coverage. In
short, rather than addressing each project’s incremental impacts in an analytical vacuum, that
approach compels regulators to ask “how are we going to fit our approach to incremental harms
into a larger strategy for achieving the outcome we want?”314
310
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Though the services may never develop an approach as intensive as the SIP process,
planning processes already prescribed by other sections of the ESA provide useful starting
points.

First, ESA section 4 already prescribes recovery plans for listed species.315 That

recovery planning creates an opportunity to develop regulatory thresholds and to integrate those
thresholds into a broader strategy for recovery.316 Second, and more ambitiously, the services
could integrate critical habitat protection into large-scale “habitat conservation plans” (HCPs)
prepared pursuant to sections 9 and 10 of the ESA.317 These plans allow otherwise prohibited
“takes” of endangered species so long as the entity responsible for the take is participating in a
plan expected to provide a net benefit to the impacted species.318 The services could offer the
same deal for projects causing small adverse changes to habitat: if the project proponent
participates in a broader HCP that will create an overall improvement in habitat conditions, the
services would not find adverse modification.319 Though implementing such an approach would
be challenging,320 the benefits might be substantial.321 A coordinated conservation approach
could provide much more conservation benefit than many isolated and partial minimization

and some regulators believe their planning approaches have worked reasonably well. See, e.g., Owen, supra note
311, at 283 n.101 (noting that EPA employees involved in SIP planning viewed the process as reasonably
successful)
315
16 U.S.C. § 1533(f) (2006).
316
That shift would significantly change recovery planning, which critics allege has traditionally involved
vague plans and modest goals. See, e.g., Federico Cheever, The Road to Recovery: A New Way of Thinking about
the Endangered Species Act, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1996).
317
See 16 U.S.C. C 1539(a)(2)(A) (2006);
318
See Ruhl and Salzman, supra note 291, at 648-49 (explaining the program).
319
To be legally tenable, that approach would need to treat participation in the HCP as part of the “action”
subject to consultation. I see nothing in the statute that precludes such an approach.
320
HCPs have received mixed reviews in the environmental law literature. See Alejandro E. Camacho,
Can Regulation Evolve? Lessons from a Case Study in Maladaptive Management, 55 UCLA L. REV. 293 (2007)
(criticizing the program, but also summarizing arguments in its favor). But the more critical discussions still suggest
that HCPs can be done well; Camacho, for example, criticizes the program primarily for being overly closed to
public participation and scrutiny and because of an absence of monitoring and adaptation, but notes that HCPs
prepared more openly appear to have produced better results. See id. at 318-19.
321
The literature on the potential benefits of HCPs is extensive. See, e.g., Joseph L. Sax, Environmental
Law at the Turn of the Century: A Reportorial Fragment, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2375, 2381 (2002) (explaining potential
political benefits); Thompson, supra note 30, at 318-19 (describing potential benefits of HCPs, though also
acknowledging that transaction costs have been substantial).
65

efforts,322 and more extensive enforcement of the adverse modification prohibition could create
an important incentive for participation in large-scale HCPs.323
B. Praising the Complexity
The preceding discussion suggests what may seem an odd hybrid of regulatory
approaches. It would include elements of prohibitory regulation, negotiated feasibility-based
standards, trading-based mitigation schemes, and planning-based approaches, all integrated into
a system that combines slightly increased centralization with a continued reliance on project-byproject, location-specific regulatory controls.

It may seem like an approach developed by

indecisively ordering everything on the environmental regulatory menu, notwithstanding years of
academic arguments asserting that one or a few of those tools is best.324 But the hybrid nature of
the prescribed reforms reflects the services’ need, in a world of flawed options, for a regulatory
toolbox with multiple tools. 325 But if a creative and pragmatic agency holds discretion to select
from among a variety of approaches, the portfolio of regulatory approaches should be superior to
any of its imperfect parts.
That need for regulatory portfolios leads to a broader point about regulating complicated
environmental challenges. It is easy to look at our environmental law system, with its “great
undigestible masses of statutes… interpreted by mounds of regulations, all densely packed with
bizarre terms and opaque acronyms,”326 and pine for some simplicity. The sometimes-painful,
322
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often contentious history of implementing that system only increases the temptation. Surely, one
might think, among those approaches (or waiting to be developed) is a better way, and surely
many of the existing approaches are deeply flawed or obsolete and can simply be discarded. But
the critical habitat experience suggests that such hopes, while perfectly understandable, may well
be misplaced. A diversity of regulatory approaches will often be a strength rather than a
weakness, for there are elements of wisdom in many of the regulatory approaches would-be
reformers sometimes dismiss.

And while changes and reforms will still be necessary for

environmental law to take on its next generation of challenges, the critical habitat story suggests
that some of the changes can be subtle. Rather than scrapping existing regulatory approaches
and creating something entirely new, the best reforms may involve doing some modest tinkering
with existing incentives and approaches, giving agencies a few new tools to use, and trusting,
notwithstanding all the anti-governmental rhetoric of contemporary politics, that those agencies
will have the creativity and commitment to put those tools to good use.

CONCLUSION
The listing of the polar bear as a threatened species and the subsequent designation of its
critical habitat were not isolated events. Climate change is likely to lead to many other species
listings, and dozens of species initially listed for other reasons also face climate change as a
major threat.327 And climate change is just one of many major environmental impacts caused by
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For just a few of the many possible examples, see U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Determination of
Endangered Status for the Georgia Pigtoe Mussel, Interrupted Rocksnail, and Rough Hornsnail and Designation of
Critical Habitat, 75 Fed. Reg. 67512, 67523 (November 2, 2010) (identifying climate change as a threat); National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Threatened Status for the Puget Sound/Georgia Basin Distinct Population
Segments of Yelloweye and Canary Rockfish and Endangered Status for the Puget Sound/Georgia Basin Distinct
Population Segment of Bocaccio Rockfish, 75 Fed. Reg. 22276, 22282 (April 28, 2010) (acknowledging climate
change as a potentially major threat); National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Threatened Status for
Southern Distinct Population Segment of Eulachon, 75 Fed. Reg. 13012, 13015 (March 18, 2010) (“We also
67

an accumulation of seemingly minor actions.328 The central regulatory challenge addressed by
this Article is large and is continuing to grow.
Current regulatory approaches are only partially equipped to address that challenge. The
services have taken substantial steps to address habitat degradation, and their efforts undermine
critiques alleging that ESA implementation is characterized by rigid inflexibility or,
alternatively, by regulatory capture. But the empirical record still indicates a substantial gap
between statutory requirements and actual performance, and the gap is particularly acute where
incremental degradation is occurring. That gap need not be quite so large; tools to address some
of those tensions exist, and could be exploited with only modest adjustments to existing
regulatory systems.

The services, and any other regulator seeking to address incremental

environmental degradation, can and should take advantage of those opportunities.

recognize that climate change impact on ocean conditions is likely the most serious threat to persistence of eulachon
in all four sub-areas of the DPS.”).
328
See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
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